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Abstract
It is well known that every stable matching instance I has a rotation poset R(I) that can be
computed efficiently and the downsets of R(I) are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable
matchings of I. Furthermore, for every poset P, an instance I(P) can be constructed efficiently
so that the rotation poset of I(P) is isomorphic to P. In this case, we say that I(P) realizes
P. Many researchers exploit the rotation poset of an instance to develop fast algorithms or to
establish the hardness of stable matching problems.
To make the problem of sampling stable matchings more tractable, Bhatnagar et al. [1]
introduced stable matching instances whose preference lists are restricted but nevertheless model
situations that arise in practice. In this paper, we study four such parameterized restrictions;
our goal is to characterize the rotation posets that arise from these models:
1. k-bounded, where each agent has at most k acceptable partners;
2. k-attribute, where each agent has an associated k dimensional profile and her preferences
are determined by a linear function of the others’ profiles;
3. (k1, k2)-list, where the men and women can be partitioned into k1 and k2 sets (respectively)
such that within each set all agents have identical preferences;
4. k-range, where there is an objective ranking for each set of agents, and each person ranks
agents from the other group within k of the others’ objective ranks.
We prove that there is a constant k so that every rotation poset is realized by some instance
in models 1–3 (k ≥ 3 for k-bounded, k ≥ 6 for k-attribute, and k1 ≥ 2, k2 =∞ for (k1, k2)-list,
respectively). We describe efficient algorithms for constructing such instances given the Hasse
diagram of a poset. As a consequence, the fundamental problem of counting stable matchings
remains #BIS-complete even for these restricted instances.
For k-range preferences, we show that a poset P is realizable if and only if the Hasse diagram
of P has pathwidth bounded by functions of k. Using this characterization, we show that
the following problems are fixed parameter tractable when parametrized by the range of the
instance: exactly counting and uniformly sampling stable matchings, finding median, sex-equal,
and balanced stable matchings.
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1 Introduction
In the last 60 years, the stable marriage problem and its variants have emerged as central topics in
economics, computer science, and mathematics. The basic problem is phrased as follows. Let M
and W be disjoint sets of n agents, traditionally referred to as men and women, respectively. Each
agent has a preference list that ranks (all or some) members of the opposite sex. The goal is to find
a matching µ between M and W such that no m ∈M and w ∈ W mutually prefer each other to
their partners in µ. Such a matching is called stable. In their seminal work, Gale and Shapley [15]
proved that a stable matching µ always exists and provided an O(n2) time algorithm for finding
one. This run-time has been shown to be optimal in a variety of computational models [18, 38].
While a stable matching instance of size n may have 2Θ(n) stable matchings [25, 30], the Gale-
Shapley algorithm outputs only two kinds stable matchings—the man-optimal/woman-pessimal
and the woman-optimal/man-pessimal stable matchings. That is, these stable matchings are the
best for one group of agents but the worst for the other group. To address this inequity, researchers
investigated various notions of “fair” stable matchings [6, 7, 9, 13, 19, 21, 23, 26, 30, 33, 37, 44] and
studied the problem of counting and sampling stable matchings uniformly at random [1, 5, 20, 22].
For all of these problems, crucial insights are gained by understanding the combinatorial structure
of the set of stable matchings.
Irving and Leather [22] showed that every stable matching instance I has an associated rotation
poset R(I) that determines the structure of the set of stable matchings for I. In particular, they
proved that the stable matchings of I are in one-to-one correspondence with the downsets of R(I)
and that R(I) can be computed efficiently. Furthermore, given any finite poset P, there is a stable
matching instance I = I(P) whose rotation poset is isomorphic to P, and I can be computed
efficiently as well. We say that such an instance I realizes P.
Many problems related to finding a fair stable matching are NP-hard. They include computing a
median stable matching [6, 7, 44], a balanced stable matching [13] or a sex-equal stable matching [26,
37]. A natural approach then is to consider stable matching instances whose preference lists are
restricted but nevertheless model situations that arise in practice. Below, we consider three such
models from the work of Bhatnagar et al. [1].
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• In the k-attribute model, each agent has an associated k-dimensional profile and their preference
lists are determined by applying a linear function to the profiles of their potential partners.
The model is motivated by online dating sites. In this context, participants are frequently
asked an extensive set of questions. Some answers are used to create a participant’s profile
while other answers are used to formulate a function that ranks possible dates according to
the others’ profiles.
• In the k-range model, there is an objective ranking for each set of agents. Each person ranks
agents from the other group to within k of of their objective ranks. This model captures
the scenario when participants make use of “official rankings” to create their preference lists.
Students, for instance, might use their state’s ranking of nearby high schools to guide their
choices, while the schools might base their preferences according to the students’ test scores.
The participants do not have to copy the official rankings exactly; but they cannot deviate
that much from the objective ranks when they make their choices.
• In the k-list model, each set of agents can be partitioned into k groups such that agents within
each group have identical preference lists. The model applies to situations when students
who aspire to be engineers all have the same preferences, students who plan to pursue a
business-related major have the same preferences, etc. Similarly, high schools with a STEM
focus may rank students the same way while high schools with a focus on the arts may have
their own rankings.
Bhatnagar et al. were interested in sampling stable matchings using the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) method. For general instances, however, the method can take exponential time to
converge to equilibrium. Such worst-case behavior occurs, for example, when the rotation poset of
the instance has d bottom elements b1, b2, . . . , bd, d top elements t1, t2, . . . , td and a single element
that c such that bi ≺ c ≺ tj for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} with d = θ(n). We refer to this poset as the
star poset Pd.
When the preference lists of the agents are restricted, we expect the rotation posets of the
instances to be restricted as well. Yet Bhatnagar et al. showed that there are instances from each of
the three models described above that have Pd as a rotation poset even when the parameter k is a
small constant (i.e., k = 2 in the k-attribute model, k = 5 in the k-range model and k = 4 in the
k-list model). That is, even under narrow conditions, MCMC is not a feasible method for sampling
stable matchings.
Following [1], Chebolu et al. [5] considered the problem of counting the number of stable matchings
(#SM) for instances in the k-attribute model and a related k-Euclidean model (introduced by
Bogomolnaia and Laslier [3]). They showed that #SM is #BIS-complete even when the preference
lists are restricted to the 3-attribute and 2-Euclidean models. Thus, under a widely believed
conjecture of Dyer et al. [12], #SM does not admit a fully polynomial randomized approximation
scheme (FPRAS). Chebolu et al. established their result for the 3-attribute model by showing that
for any bipartite graph G, there is a 3-attribute stable matching instance whose rotation poset’s
Hasse diagram is isomorphic to G.1
Bhatnagar et al. [1] and Chebolu et al. [5] established their hardness results by constructing
stable matching instances with restricted preference lists that realized certain families of rotation
posets. Our goal is to go a step further: to characterize the family of rotation posets realized by
restricted families of stable matching instances.
1The intent is for the independent sets of G to be in one-to-one correspondence with the downsets of the rotation
poset.
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1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we initiate the comprehensive study of the expressive power of restricted preference
list models in terms of the rotation posets that instances in the model realize. We characterize
the rotation posets for the k-attribute and k-range models, as well as the following preference list
models:
k-bounded model: Each agent’s preference list has length at most k.
(k1, k2)-list model: The men and women can be partitioned into k1 and k2 groups respectively such
that within each group all agents have identical preference lists. When we allow the women
(or the men) to have any kind of preference lists, we refer to the model as the (k1,∞)-list (or
the (∞, k2)-list) model. Notice that the (k1, k2)-list model generalizes Bhatnagar et al.’s k-list
model – their k-list is precisely our (k1, k2)-list model with k1 = k2 = k.
Except for the k-bounded model, we shall assume that the preference lists of all agents in these
models are complete.2 We now describe our main contributions.
Generic instance construction. First, we present a generic construction algorithm that given
H(P), the Hasse diagram of poset P, and an edge coloring φ of H(P) returns a stable matching
instance I whose rotation poset is isomorphic to P. The number of agents of I and the running
time of the algorithm is O(p + q), where p and q are the number of vertices and edges of H(P)
respectively (cf. Theorem 3.8).
More importantly for us, the algorithm is fairly simple and yet remarkably versatile. For a fixed
poset P, we can produce stable matching instances with different properties that still realize P by
changing the input edge coloring and tweaking some parts of the algorithm. For example, when
φ assigns the same color to all the edges of H(P), the algorithm produces an instance with 4p
agents—an improvement to Irving and Leather’s construction [22] when H(P) is a dense graph
because their instance’s number of agents depends on both p and q. In order to obtain instances
I realizeable in the k-bounded model, we take φ to a proper edge coloring of H(P), while for the
(k1, k2)-list model, φ assigns the color v to all edges leaving node v.
Constructing instances in restricted models. Using the generic construction algorithm, we
establish that for a given P, stable matching instances that realize P can be constructed efficiently
for the following preference list models:
• k-bounded for any k ≥ 3 (cf. Theorem 4.2),
• k-attribute for any k ≥ 6 (cf. Theorem 4.7),
• (k,∞)-list or (∞, k)-list for any k ≥ 2 (cf. Theorem 5.3).
In other words, the above models are “rich” enough that every poset can be realized by some
instance in that model.
Our results for the k-bounded and (k,∞)-list (or (∞, k)-list) models are tight. The rotation
posets of instances in the 1-bounded model can only be the empty poset because all the instances
have only one stable matching while those in the 2-bounded model can only be antichains. Thus, it
is surprising that in the 3-bounded model all posets can be a rotation poset of some instance.
2The case for incomplete preference lists will be addressed in the discussion section of the paper.
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In the (∞, k)-list model, when k = 1, all the women have the same preference list. This model
is equivalent to one studied by Irving et al. [24] where they show that all instances from this model
have a unique stable matching. Once again, these instances have the empty poset as a rotation
poset. But when k = 2, the women can have two different preference lists. According to our result,
a drastic change occurs and any poset can be the rotation poset of some instance.
As for the k-attribute model, Chebolu et al. [5] proved that instances in the 1-attribute model
have paths as rotation posets. Bhatnagar et al. [1] showed that instances in the 2-attribute model
can have star posets are rotation posets. We suspect that our result can be improved to show that
instances in the k-attribute model, with k < 6, can have an arbitrary rotation poset.
Our structural results for the k-bounded, k-attribute, and (k,∞)- and (∞, k)-list models have
the following implications: any “structural” stable matching problem—i.e., any problem whose
solution depends only on the rotation poset of an instance—is as hard in these restricted models as
the general case. We state two explicit consequences:
• In the k-bounded (k ≥ 3), k-attribute (k ≥ 6), and (k,∞)- and (∞, k)-list (k ≥ 2) models,
#SM is #BIS-complete.
• In the models above, it is #P-hard to find generalized median stable matchings.
Characterization of k-range posets. For the k-range model, we prove that there is no fixed
constant k∗ such that every poset can be realized by some instance in the k∗-range model (cf.
Corollary 7.10). Instead, we show that the “range” of an stable matching instance I and the
pathwidth of a poset are connected in the following sense:
• When H(P) has a path decomposition of width k, there is an instance in the O(k)-range
model that realizes P . The instance has O(kp) agents and can be constructed in O(k2p2) time
(cf. Theorem 6.7).
• On the other hand, suppose I is a k-range instance. Then the Hasse diagram H of R(I) has a
pathwidth of O(k2) (cf. Theorem 7.9). Moreover, a path decomposition of H can be computed
in time polynomial in the instance size, independent of k.3
Using this characterization of rotation posets realized by k-range instances, we show that many
problems that are computationally hard for general instances are fixed parameter tractible (FPT)
in the k-range model. Specifically, we show that the following problems admit FPT algorithms:
• exactly counting stable matchings,
• sampling stable matchings exactly uniformly,
• computing generalized median stable matchings,
• finding balanced stable matchings,
• finding sex-equal stable matchings.
Since every stable matching instance is k-range for some value of k, these results show that the
range of an instance4 is a valuable parameter through which to study the parametrized complexity
of stable marriage problems.
3This is in contrast to finding path decompositions of graphs in general, as the fastest known general algorithms
for finding a path decomposition of width k require exponential time in k.
4Every stable matching instance I is a k-range instance for some value of k. The range of I is the minimum k for
which I is a k-range instance.
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1.2 Related Work
Gale and Shapley [15] first proved that all stable marriage problem (SMP) instances admit stable
matchings, and described an efficient algorithm for finding one. Knuth posed the question of
characterizing the structure of the set of stable matchings as Research Problem 6 in [30] (also in
English translation [29]). Irving and Leather’s work [22] introduced the notion of the rotation poset
and showed how it determines the structure of the set of stable matchings. Using this structural
characterization of the set of stable matchings, Irving and Leather showed that #SM is #P-complete,
implying that #SM cannot be solved in polynomial time unless P = NP [45]. Specifically, Irving and
Leather demonstrated that counting stable matchings is equivalent to #DOWN (counting downsets
in posets), a problem which was shown to be #P-complete by Provan and Ball [41]. #DOWN was
also shown to be #BIS-complete by Dyer et al. [12], hence Irving and Leather’s proof also implies
the #BIS-completeness of #SM.5
The structural properties of stable matchings revealed by Irving and Leather’s work have been
exploited in numerous subsequent works to understand the complexities of various tasks related
to the SMP. The classical book of Gusfield and Irving [21] (and references therein) describes some
early applications, while the more recent book of Manlove [33] gives an expansive overview of the
SMP and its variants. Recently, Karlin et al. [25] analyzed novel features of the rotation poset in
order to show that any SM instance of size n has at most cn stable matchings for some constant c,
thereby making significant progress towards another of Knuth’s longstanding open problems.
Bhatnagar et al. [1] introduced the k-attribute and k-range preference models we study, as
well as the k-list model which our (k1, k2)-list model generalizes. When k1 = 1 or k2 = 1, our
(k1, k2)-model corresponds to “master preference lists” (cf. Irving et al. [24]). The case where k1 = 2
was studied by McDermid and Irving [37], who showed that “sex-equal” stable matchings can be
found in polynomial time in (what we call) the (2,∞)-list model (while finding sex-equal stable
matchings is is NP-hard in general [26]). Our Theorem 5.3 implies that the structure of (2,∞)-list
SM instances is already as expressive as the general case, which makes McDermid and Irving’s
result all the more surprising.6 Chebolu et al. [5] show that counting stable matchings is #BIS
complete in the k-attribute model for any k ≥ 3, as well as the k-Euclidean model of Bogomolnaia
and Laslier [3]. Thus our Corollary 4.7 gives an alternate (arguably simpler) proof of Chebolu et
al.’s result, albeit for the weaker condition k ≥ 6.
Finding (and verifying) stable matchings with restricted preferences has also been studied in the
centralized [31] and distributed [27] settings. Ku¨nnemann et al. [31] showed that for the k-attribute,
k-list, k-Euclidean, and “single-peaked” preference models, stable matchings can be computed in
o(n2) time when k = O(1). For k = ω(log n), however, k-attribute and k-Euclidean preferences
require Ω(n2) time, assuming the strong exponential time hypothesis. In the distributed setting,
Khanchandani and Wattenhofer [27] study a preference model equivalent to the k-range model.
They show that in this model, a stable matching can be computed in Θ(k · n) distributed rounds
(with each node sending or receiving a single O(log n) bit message each round).
5The class #BIS is the class of counting problems reducible to to counting indpendent sets in bipartite graphs
under polynomial-time approximation-preserving transformations. In [12], Dyer et al. call this class #RHΠ1. However
we adopt the convention, common in recent works, to associate the class #RHΠ1 with its canonical complete problem,
#BIS. Dyer et al. conjecture that no #BIS-complete problem has a fully polynomial randomized approximation
scheme (FPRAS), and prove that #DOWN is #BIS-complete.
6Computing a sex-equal stable matching can be defined in terms of finding a zero weight downset in the associated
rotation poset, where weights are assigned according to the actual preference lists. Theorem 5.3 implies that rotation
posets of (2,∞)-list instances are arbitrary, but the restriction on the preferences limits the flexibility of the associated
weights of elements in the rotation poset. McDermid and Irving’s result implies that the limitation on the weights is
sufficient to admit a polynomial-time algorithm.
5
The parametrized complexity of two NP-hard variants of the SMP were studied by Marx and
Schlotter [35, 36]. The first paper [35] studies the SMP with incomplete preferences and ties, a
problem for which finding a maximum size stable matching is NP-hard [34]. The second paper [36]
analyzes the Hospital/Residents problem with couples, for which it is NP-hard to determine if
a stable matching exists. Marx and Schlotter show that the two problems are fixed parameter
tractable (parametrized by the number of ties, the maximum length, or overall length of ties for the
former problem, and the number of couples in the latter problem). That is, these problems can be
solved in polynomial time whenever the relevant parameter is a fixed constant (independent of n).
For an overview of parametrized complexity, see [11].
Recently, Gupta et al. [19] considered the parametrized complexity of several hard variants
of the SMP, parametrized by the treewidth of the “primal graph” (i.e., the graph of acceptable
partners), and the treewidth of the Hasse diagram of the rotation poset of an instance. In particular,
they give FPT algorithms for computing sex-equal and balanced stable matchings parametrized by
treewidth of the Hasse diagram. Combined with our characterization of the rotation posets arising
from k-range preferences in Theorem 7.9, Gupta et al.’s results immediately imply FPT algorithms
for finding sex-equal and balanced stable matchings parametrized by the range of an instance (cf.
Corollary 8.8).
1.3 Paper Overview
Here we give a high level overview of the remainder of the paper. In Section 2, we give the necessary
background and notation to understand the technical portion of the paper. In order to make our
paper as self-contained as possible, Section 2 contains substantial background on the SMP, especially
the structural results of Irving and Leather. We formally introduce the four models of restricted
preference lists studied later in the paper, and give a brief overview of the results for pathwidth
needed in our analysis of the k-range model.
In Section 3, we present the generic construction algorithm ConstructInstance. The construction
takes a finite poset P—or more specifically, the Hasse diagram of P, H(P)—as well as an edge
coloring of H(P), and constructs a stable matching instance whose rotation poset is isomorphic to P .
Our generic construction is conceptually different from the construction of Irving and Leather [22],
though our analysis is similar to the one described in Gusfield and Irving’s [21] book for Irving and
Leather’s construction.
Section 4 contains our main results for the k-bounded and k-attribute models. The argument
for the k-bounded model is straightforward and makes use of results from Section 3. The approach
we took for the k-attribute model is similar in spirit, but more general than Bhatnagar et al.’s. Our
key technical tool is the Gale’s construction of “neighborly polytopes” [16].
In Section 5, we develop our main result for the (k,∞)-list model by first constructing an
instance with incomplete preference lists using ConstructInstance. We then embed the men’s lists
into two complete preference lists (while completing the women’s preference lists arbitrarily) and
show that the rotation poset of the new instance is the same as the original instance.
Sections 6 and 7 present our main results for the k-range model. In Section 6, we begin with a
width-k path decomposition of H(P), the Hasse diagram of poset P . We tweak ConstructInstance so
that it incorporates the path decomposition into the construction of a stable matching instance. We
then expand each agents’ preference list into a complete one, making sure that the instance has range
O(k). In Section 7, we study instances in the k-range model and show that a path decomposition
of width O(k2) can be efficiently computed for their rotation posets. In Section 8, we show how
the path decompositions can be used to obtain FPT algorithms for several computationally hard
problems: counting and uniformly sampling stable matchings, and finding a median, sex-equal, and
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balanced stable matchings.
Finally, the paper concludes with Section 9 which discusses related questions and directions for
future work.
2 Background and Preliminaries
In the classical version of the stable marriage problem, a stable matching instance I = (M,W,P )
consists of a set of n men M and a set of n women W together with their preferences P . For
each m ∈M , P contains a preference list Pm that is a total ordering of W , and symmetrically
each w ∈ W has a corresponding preference list Pw that is a total ordering of M in P . For each
a ∈ M ∪W , we refer to Pa(1) as a’s most preferred partner, Pa(2) as a’s second most preferred
partner etc. If b = Pa(i), we say that a assigned b a rank of i and write Pa(b) = i. Throughout this
paper, we assume that n = |M | = |W | is the size of the instance.
A matching µ of I is a set of n man-woman pairs such that every agent is part of exactly
one pair. Suppose (m,w′), (m′, w) ∈ µ with m 6= m′ and w 6= w′. We call (m,w) a blocking pair
of µ if m and w mutually prefer each other to their partners in µ; that is, Pm(w) < Pm(w
′) and
Pw(m) < Pw(m
′). We say that µ is a stable matching if it has no blocking pairs. Gale and
Shapley’s seminal paper proved that every stable matching instance I has a stable matching [15].
Moreover, they presented an algorithm that finds a stable matching of I in O(n2) time (assuming
preferences can be accessed and compared in unit time).
A common extension of the stable marriage problem allows for the number of men and women
to be different and for each agent a to have a preference list that ranks only a subset of acceptable
partners from the opposite group (i.e., the agents may have incomplete preference lists). The
agents m and w form an acceptable pair if the two agents are acceptable to each other. For
such an instance, a matching µ is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each agent is part of
at most one pair. We call (m,w) a blocking pair of µ if (i) they are an acceptable pair, (ii) m is
either unmatched or prefers w to his partner in µ and (iii) w is either unmatched or prefers m to
his partner in µ. Once again, a matching is stable if it has no blocking pairs. Like the classical
case, every instance in this setting has a stable matching and the Gale-Shapley algorithm can easily
be modified to find one. Furthermore, a well-known result by Gale and Sotomayor [17] (cf. [42])
states that every stable matching of the instance has the same number of pairs and matches exactly
the same set of agents.
To streamline our discussion, we shall use SM instances to refer to instances in both the
classical version and its extension to incomplete preference lists. When we consider instances in the
classical case only, we shall say that the SM instances have complete preference lists. On the
other hand, when we consider instances with incomplete preference lists, we shall assume that the
preference lists of all agents are consistent (that is, a is in b’s preference list if and only if b is in
a’s preference list) and all agents appear in every stable matching of I.7 Hence, we can again define
the size of I as |M | = |W |.
In general, an SM instance can have many stable matchings. We say that a pair (m,w) is a
stable pair if it is part of some stable matching of the instance. We also say that m and w are each
other’s stable partners. Surprisingly, the Gale-Shapley algorithm can produce only two types of
stable matchings. In its man-oriented version, the output is the man-optimal stable matching ,
which is also the woman-pessimal stable matching . That is, every man is matched to his best
stable partner while simultaneously every woman is matched to her worst stable partner. In the
7Making preference lists consistent and removing participants that are never part of a stable matching do not affect
the set of stable matchings of I.
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woman-oriented version, the output is the woman-optimal stable matching , which is also the
man-pessimal stable matching and defined accordingly.
2.1 Posets and DAGs
A partially ordered set or poset P = (X,≺) consists of a set X and a binary relation ≺ on the
elements of X that is antisymmetric and transitive.8 Two posets P = (X,≺) and P ′ = (Y,≺′) are
isomorphic if there exists bijection f : X → Y satisfying x ≺ y ⇐⇒ f(x) ≺′ f(y). The Hasse
diagram of P is the directed acyclic graph H(P) = (X,E) such that
E = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X |x ≺ y and no z satisfies x ≺ z ≺ y} .
A subset Z ⊆ X is a downset (also a closed subset or an order ideal) of P if for every z ∈ Z
and y ∈ X such that y ≺ z then y ∈ Z. That is, if z ∈ Z then every predecessor y of z is also in
Z.
We extend the above terminology to directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). Let G = (V,E) be a DAG.
We call a subset Z ⊆ V a downset of G if for every z ∈ Z and y ∈ V such that there is a path
from y to z (i.e., y is an ancestor of z) then y ∈ Z. We denote the number of downsets of G by
down(G).
The transitive closure of DAG G = (V,E) is another DAG G′ = (V,E′) so that (u, v) ∈ E′ if
and only if there is a path from u to v in G. In the later parts of the paper, instead of the Hasse
diagram of a poset P = (X,≺), we will work with a DAG H = (X,E) so that the transitive closure
of H and H(P) are exactly the same. That is, with slight abuse of notation, their transitive closure
is P. We note the following.
Observation 2.1. Let H and H ′ be two DAGs whose transitive closures are exactly the same.
Then Z is a downset of H if and only if Z is a downset of H ′.
In the problem #DOWN, we are given a poset P and the goal is to count the number of distinct
downsets of P. The above observation implies that if H is a DAG whose transitive closure is P,
then down(H) is exactly the number of downsets of P.
2.2 The Rotation Poset
To explore all the stable matchings of an instance I, we need to consider its rotation poset, described
below.
Definition 2.2. Let µ be a stable matching of SM instance I. Let ρ be a circular list of man-woman
pairs from µ:
ρ = (m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (m`, w`).
We say that ρ is a rotation exposed in µ if for all i = 1, 2, . . . , `, wi+1 is the first woman on mi’s
preference list after wi who prefers mi to her partner mi+1 in µ (where subscripts are computed
modulo `). That is, for all i we have:
• wi+1 prefers mi to mi+1, and
• there is no w with Pmi(wi) < Pmi(w) < Pmi(wi+1) such that w prefers mi to her partner m
in µ.
8Throughout the paper, we will assume that all posets have a finite number of elements.
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If ρ = (m1, w1), . . . , (m`, w`) is a rotation exposed in µ, then we can form the elimination of
ρ, denoted µ \ ρ, as follows:
µ \ ρ = µ \ {(mi, wi) | i = 1, 2, . . . , `} ∪ {(mi, wi+1) | i = 1, 2, . . . , `} .
The matching µ \ ρ is another stable matching. In fact, Irving and Leather showed that every stable
matching µ can be obtained by starting from the man-optimal stable matching µ0 and eliminating
a sequence of rotations. More formally, they proved the following.
Lemma 2.3 (Irving & Leather [22]). Let µ be a stable matching of SM instance I. Then there
exists a sequence of rotations ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 and stable matchings µ0, µ1, . . . , µk = µ such that µ0
is the man-optimal stable matching and, for each i, ρi is a rotation exposed in µi, and µi+1 = µi \ ρi.
Moreover, the set {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1} uniquely specifies µ.
We denote as R(I) the set of all rotations exposed in any stable matching of I. Lemma 2.3 shows
that every stable matching µ of I can be associated with a unique subset Rµ ⊆ R(I). For example,
the the man-optimal stable matching, µ0, corresponds to the empty set while the woman-optimal
stable matching, µz, corresponds to R(I). Not all subsets of R(I), however, correspond to some
stable matching of I. To characterize which ones do, Irving and Leather defined a poset structure
on R(I) as follows.
Definition 2.4. Suppose ρ, ρ′ ∈ R(I). We say ρ precedes ρ′ and write ρ ≺ ρ′ if for every stable
matching µ in which ρ′ is exposed, we have ρ ∈ Rµ. That is, ρ ≺ ρ′ if ρ was eliminated in every
stable matching in which ρ′ is exposed.
Theorem 2.5 (Irving & Leather [22]). Let I be an SM instance. Then R(I) = (R(I),≺) is a poset.
Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the the stable matchings of I and the
downsets of R(I).
We refer to R(I) as the rotation poset of I. In [23], Irving et al. showed that a DAG whose
transitive closure is the rotation poset R(I) can be computed in time O(n3). This runtime was
improved to O(n2) by Gusfield in [20].
Theorem 2.6 (Gusfield [20]). Given any SM instance I of size n, a DAG G(I) whose transitive
closure is R(I) can be computed in O(n2) time.
We shall call G(I) the rotation digraph of I. Since the transitive closure of G(I) is R(I), we
note that the Hasse diagram of R(I) is in fact a subgraph of G(I).
Example 2.7. Consider the SM instance shown below.
m1 : w1 w2 w3 w4
m2 : w2 w4 w1 w3
m3 : w3 w4 w2 w1
m4 : w4 w2 w3 w1
w1 : m2 m1 m3 m4
w2 : m3 m1 m4 m2
w3 : m4 m1 m2 m3
w4 : m1 m3 m4 m2
It is four stable matchings:
µ0 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), (m4, w4)}
µ1 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w4)}
µ2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w4), (m4, w3)}
µ3 = {(m1, w4), (m2, w1), (m3, w2), (m4, w3)}
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Figure 1: The rotation poset (left), R(I) and the DAG G(I) (right) computed by Gusfield’s algorithm. The
edge labels in G(I) indicate the “rule” associated with the edge—see Remark 2.8
where µ0 is the man-optimal stable matching and µ3 is the woman-optimal stable matching. It has
three rotations:
ρ1 = (m1, w1), (m2, w2)
ρ2 = (m3, w3), (m4, w4)
ρ3 = (m1, w2), (m3, w4).
The correspondence between the stable matchings of I and the downsets of R(I) are as follows:
µ0 with ∅, µ1 with {ρ1}, µ2 with {ρ1, ρ2}, and µ3 with {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}.
Let ρ = (m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (m`, w`) be a rotation of SM instance I. When ρ is eliminated
from a stable matching, each mi is matched to wi+1 or, equivalently, each wi is matched to mi−1.
We say that ρ moves mi down to wi+1 because mi prefers wi to wi+1. If w is strictly between wi
and wi+1 in mi’s preference list, we also say that ρ moves mi below w. Similarly, ρ moves wi
up to mi−1 because wi prefers mi−1 to mi. If m is strictly between mi−1 and mi in wi’s preference
list, ρ moves wi above m.
Remark 2.8. The rotation digraph G(I) is defined by adding edges according to the following
rules [21]. (We have labeled the edges of G(I) in the previous example with the rules that were
used to create the edges.)
Rule 1. Suppose (m,w) is in rotation ρ. If ρ′ is the (unique) rotation that moves m to w, then
there is a directed edge from ρ′ to ρ.
In the previous example, there is an edge from ρ1 to ρ3 because of (m1, w2) and an edge from
ρ2 to ρ3 because of (m3, w4).
Rule 2. Suppose (m,w) is not in rotation ρ. If ρ′ is the (unique) rotation that moves w above m, ρ
is the (unique) rotation that moves m below w and ρ′ 6= ρ, then there is a directed edge from
ρ′ to ρ. Note that for these steps to happen, w is in ρ′ while m is in ρ.
In the previous example, there is an edge from ρ1 to ρ2 because of (m4, w2). Rotation ρ2 was
not exposed in µ0 because m4 prefers w2 to w4 and w2 prefers m4 to m2. Rotation ρ1 moves w2
above m4. Only when ρ1 is eliminated is ρ2 exposed and ρ2 moves m4 below w2 to w3. There is
also an edge from ρ2 to ρ3 because of (m1, w3). Rotation ρ2 moves w3 above m1 while rotation ρ3
moves m1 below w3.
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The two rules above can be thought of informally as the reasons for the precedence relation
among the rotations of I. In Section 3, we shall use Rule 2 extensively to create SM instances
(whereas Irving and Leather’s construction forces precedence between rotations by appealing to
Rule 1).
2.3 Realizing Posets as Rotation Posets
Given a poset P, we say that an SM instance I realizes P if the rotation poset of I, R(I), is
isomorphic to P. Irving and Leather showed the following fundamental result.
Theorem 1 (Irving & Leather [22]). Let P be a poset whose Hasse diagram has p vertices and q
edges. There is an SM instance I that realizes P. Moreover, the number of agents of I is O(p+ q)
and the instance I can be constructed in O(p+ q) time.
Together, Theorems 2.5 and 1 show that counting stable matchings and the downsets of a
(finite) poset are essentially equivalent: any instance of one problem can be efficiently reduced to an
equivalent instance of the other.
In order to show that an SM instance has a particular rotation poset, it will be useful to have a
criterion under which two SM instances I and I ′ have isomorphic rotation posets. We describe a
sufficient condition below that is partly based on Irving and Leather’s notion of “shortlists” [22].
Definition 2.9. Let I = (M,W,P ) be an SM instance. Let a ∈M∪W . The symmetric shortlist
of a, Sa, is the sublist of Pa consisting of agents b such that
• b is the man-optimal or woman-optimal stable partner of a or b lies between these two partners
in Pa, and
• a is the man-optimal or woman-optimal stable partner of b or a lies between these two partners
in Pb.
We shall use S(I) to denote the set containing all agents’ symmetric shortlists.
Here’s a simple fact about symmetric shortlists.
Proposition 2.10. Let I = (M,W,P ) be an SM instance. For any agent a, a is part of S(b) if and
only if b is part of S(a).
Example 2.11 (Example 2.7 continued). The shortlists of the instance are shown below.
m1 : w1 w2 w3 w4
m2 : w2 w1
m3 : w3 w4 w2
m4 : w4 w2 w3
w1 : m2 m1
w2 : m3 m1 m4 m2
w3 : m4 m1 m3
w4 : m1 m3 m4
Lemma 2.12. Let I = (M,W,P ). Let I ′ be obtained from I be replacing each agent’s preference
list Pa with their symmetric shortlist Sa; i.e., I
′ = (M,W,S(I)). Then I and I ′ have identical
rotation posets and stable matchings.
Proof. According to Lemma 2.3, the starting point for computing all rotations of I is the man-
optimal stable matching µ0. Once all the rotations have been eliminated, the woman-optimal stable
matching is obtained. Thus, for any woman w ∈W , men that she ranked before her woman-optimal
stable partner or after her man-optimal stable partner will not affect the rotation poset of I. In
particular, for such a man m, the pair (m,w) will never be part of Rules 1 or 2 in Remark 2.8. So
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these men can be removed from w’s preference list, w can in turn be removed from their preference
lists and the resulting instance has exactly the same rotation poset and the same set of stable
matchings as I. By a similar argument, for each man m ∈ M , all the women he ranked before
his man-optimal stable partner or after his woman-optimal stable partner can be removed, m in
turn can be removed from their preference lists and the instance’s rotation poset and set of stable
matchings will not be affected. But these actions imply that we have reduced each agent’s preference
list Pa to their symmetric shortlist Sa. The lemma follows.
Corollary 2.13. Let I = (M,W,P ) and I ′ = (M,W,P ′) such that S(I) = S(I ′). Then I and I ′
have the identical rotation posets and stable matchings.
Corollary 2.14. Let I = (M,W,P ) be an SM instance with incomplete preference lists.9 Let
I ′ = (M,W,P ′) be obtained from I by adding to the end of each incomplete preference list its
missing agents. Then I and I ′ have identical rotation posets and stable matchings.
Proof. First, we note that running the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm on I and I ′ returns
the same man-optimal stable matching µ0. Similarly, running the woman-oriented Gale-Shapley
algorithm on I and I ′ returns the same woman-optimal stable matching µz. This means that the
“extra” agents added to complete the preference lists will not be a part of the symmetric shortlist of
S(I ′) and S(I) = S(I ′). By Corollary 2.13, the result follows.
Both Corollary 2.13 and 2.14 will be useful in Sections 3–6 where our goal is to construct an SM
instance that realizes a poset P but whose preference lists obey certain properties. Our strategy is
to first create a “smaller” SM instance I that realizes P. We then expand each agent’s preference
list into a complete list while making sure their symmetric shortlists stay the same. Thus, the new
SM instance still realizes P.
2.4 Restricted Preference Models
Let k, k1 and k2 be positive integers. We now describe the four models of restricted preference lists
that we will study in the paper. SM instances in the k-bounded model have incomplete preference
lists (unless k = n) while those in the k-attribute, (k1, k2)-list and k-range have complete preference
lists.
k-Bounded Preferences An SM instance I has k-bounded preferences if each agent’s prefer-
ence list has length at most k. We denote the family of k-bounded SM instances with n men and n
women by Bound(k, n), and Bound(k) =
⋃
n∈Z+ Bound(k, n).
k-Attribute Preferences An SM instance I has k-attribute preferences if each agent a ∈
M ∪W has an associated vector ~a ∈ Rk and linear function ϕa : Rk → R. We refer to the pair
(~a, ϕa) as a’s profile . The preference list of a is constructed from the profiles of the agents from
the other group as follows: a has Pa(1) = b1, Pa(2) = b2, . . . , Pa(n) = bn if and only if
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ϕa(~b1) > ϕa(~b2) > · · · > ϕa(~bn).
We denote the family of k-attribute SM instances with n men and n women by Attr(k, n), and
Attr(k) =
⋃
n∈Z+ Attr(k, n).
9Recall that we assume without loss of generality that every agent is matched in every stable matching.
10We assume that ϕa(~b) 6= ϕa(~b′) for all ~b′ 6= ~b, so that preferences are strict (without ties).
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(k1, k2)-List Preferences An SM instance I has (k1, k2)-list preferences if the men and women
can be partitioned into at most k1 and k2 groups, respectively, such that all agents within each
group have the same preference lists. If the women or men can be partitioned into an arbitrary
number of groups, we say that the SM instance has (k1,∞)-list preferences and (∞, k2)-list
preferences respectively. We denote the set of SM instances with (k1, k2)-list preferences and n
men and n women by List(k1, k2, n), and List(k1, k2) =
⋃
n∈Z+ List(k1, k2, n).
We note that the (k, k)-list model is equivalent to the k-list model of Bhatnagar et al. [1] while
the (1,∞)-list and (∞, 1)-list models correspond to stable matchings with “master lists” that Irving
et al investigated in [24].
k-Range Preferences An SM instance I has k-range preferences if there is an objective
rank f : M ∪W → [n] such that for each m ∈M and w ∈W , we have
f(w) ≤ Pm(w) ≤ f(w) + k − 1 and f(m) ≤ Pw(m) ≤ f(m) + k − 1.
That is, all (subjective) rankings by the agents are no better than and at most k − 1 positions
worse than the objective rankings. When k = 1, all men and women (respectively) have the same
preferences. We denote the family of k-range SM instances with n men and n women by Range(k, n)
and Range(k) =
⋃
n∈Z+ Range(k, n).
Remark 2.15. While the subjective ranking functions Pa, a ∈M ∪W , must be strict rankings (i.e.,
bijections between W and [n] or between M and [n] respectively), we do not require the objective
rank f : M ∪W → [n] to be bijections when restricted to M or W . For example, it could be that
f(w1) = f(w2) = 1. Thus, in the 2-range model, a man m may have Pm(w1) = 1 and Pm(w2) = 2,
or Pm(w1) = 2 and Pm(w2) = 1.
We note that given an arbritrary (complete) SM instance I, I ∈ Range(k) for some k. In
Section 6, we describe how to find the smallest such k in linear time.
2.5 Pathwidth
Here we briefly review some fundamental results regarding pathwidth, and adapt them to our
discussion of k-range preferences in Sections 6 and 7,
Definition 2.16. A path decomposition of graph G = (V,E) is a sequence (X1, X2, . . . , Xr) of
subsets of V such that:
1.
⋃r
i=1Xi = V ,
2. for each edge {u, v} ∈ E, there exists i ∈ [r] such that u, v ∈ Xi,
3. for all i, j, k ∈ [r] with i ≤ j ≤ k, we have Xi ∩Xk ⊆ Xj .
The width of the path decomposition is width(X ) = maxi |Xi| − 1. The pathwidth of G, denoted
pw(G), is the minimum width over all path decompositions of G.
We extend the definition of pathwidths to directed graphs and posets.
Definition 2.17. Let H be a directed graph. The pathdwidth of H is simply the pathwidth of
the undirected version of H. Let P be a poset, and H(P) its Hasse diagram. The pathwidth of P
is pw(P) = pw(H(P)).
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Remark 2.18. Suppose (X1, X2, . . . , Xr) is a path decomposition of G. Item 3 above implies that
for each vertex v, there is an interval Iv ⊆ [r] such that v ∈ Xi if and only if i ∈ Iv. By item 2, if
{u, v} ∈ E, then we must have Iu ∩ Iv 6= ∅. Thus, G is a subgraph of the interval graph11 defined
by the intervals {Iv | v ∈ V }. For Iv = [iv, jv], we say that v is added to the decomposition at index
iv, and removed at index jv + 1.
Definition 2.19. Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xr) be a path decomposition of graph G. We say that X is
a nice path decomposition if |X1| = 1, |Xr| = 0 and for all i ∈ [r − 1], we have |Xi4Xi+1| = 1.
That is, when X is nice, exactly one vertex is added or removed at each index.
The (omitted) proof of the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 2.20. Let G be a graph with n vertices. Suppose X = (X1, X2 . . . , Xr) is a path decom-
position of G of width k. Then G has a nice path decomposition Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Ys) of width k
with s = 2n. Moreover, Y can be computed from X in time O(kn).
The following seminal result of Bodlaender shows that computing the pathwidth and optimal
path decompositions of a graph is fixed parameter tractable.
Theorem 2.21 (Bodlaender [2]). Let G be a graph and let k ∈ N be a constant. There is an
algorithm that decides whether pw(G) ≤ k in O(f(k) |G|) time. If pw(G) ≤ k, then the algorithm
outputs a path decomposition X of G of width k.
The next corollary is immediate from Theorem 2.21 and Lemma 2.20.
Corollary 2.22. For any graph G, a nice path decomposition of G can be computed in time
O(f(k) |G|) where k = pw(G) and f is some function depending only on k.
3 A Generic Construction
Let P be a finite poset and let H(P) = (V,E) be its Hasse diagram. An edge coloring φ of
H(P) assigns each edge e ∈ E a color φ(e) ∈ Z+. In this section, we describe a simple algorithm,
ConstructInstance, that given the Hasse diagram H(P) and an edge coloring φ returns an SM instance
I = I(P, φ) whose rotation poset is isomorphic to P. The number of agents in I and the running
time of the algorithm are linear in the size of H(P). In the later sections, we will demonstrate the
remarkable versatility of ConstructInstance. By choosing appropriate edge colorings and tweaking
some of its parts, we show that the algorithm is capable of producing SM instances whose preference
lists have all kinds of properties.
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , p}. Like Irving and Leather [22], our goal of is to create rotations ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρp
so that the mapping f(v) = ρv for v ∈ [p] is an isomorphism from P to R(I). Here, we provide a
high-level description of ConstructInstance while pseudo-code is provided in Algorithm 1. Figure 2
shows an illustration of the algorithm’s output for a poset P that will serve as a running example for
the remainder of the paper. We find it instructive to view an SM instance as being defined on the
primal graph G = (M ∪W,F ), where {m,w} ∈ F if and only if m and w form an acceptable pair.
The preferences are then defined by having each agent rank its incident edges in the primal graph.
Let H(P) = (V,E) be the Hasse diagram of a poset P, and let φ : E → Z+ be an edge coloring.
The structure of G corresponding to the SM instance constructed by ConstructInstance(H(P), φ)
is as follows. For each vertex v ∈ V , there is a corresponding cycle ρv in G of length at least 4
11Recall that an interval graph on a family I of intervals is the graph G = (I, E) where {I, J} ∈ E if and only if
I ∩ J 6= ∅.
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(i.e., with at least two men and the same number of women). For each (directed) edge (u, v) ∈ E,
there is a corresponding (undirected) edge between a woman in ρu and a man in ρv. The coloring φ
determines the size and the identities of the agents in each cycle, as well as the identities of the
endpoints of edges between cycles (see Algorithm 1). Specifically, let Cv denote the set of colors of
edges incident to v in H(P). For technical reasons, if there are fewer than two edge colors incident
to v, we add additional colors to Cv to ensure |Cv| ≥ 2; cf. Lines 5–9. Each cycle ρv contains one
man and one woman for each distinct color c ∈ Cv. For (u, v) ∈ E, an edge between ρu and ρv
connects the woman in ρu and man in ρv corresponding to the color φ((u, v)). This specifies the
structure of the primal graph G.
The preferences on the edges of G are defined as follows. Each cycle ρv in G supports two
perfect matchings, one of which is preferred by all men in ρv (cf. Lines 12–14), the other of which is
preferred by all women in ρv (cf. Lines 20–29). If an agent in ρv has a neighbor in some cycle ρu with
u 6= v (added in Lines 15–19), the agent will prefer this neighbor “in between” their two neighbors in
ρv. In the following lemmas, we show that with preferences defined in this way, then (1) each cycle
ρv corresponds to a rotation in the SM instance, (2) every rotation in the SM instance corresponds
to ρv for some v, and (3) that ρv is exposed in a stable matching if and only if all rotations ρu for
which there is an edge between a woman w ∈ ρu and man m ∈ ρv have been eliminated. Thus, the
SM instance realizes P.
Conceptually, our construction differs from that of Irving and Leather. In their algorithm, a
man mu,v and a woman wu,v are created for every edge (u, v) ∈ E, and mu,v participates in the
rotations ρu and ρv to enforce the precedence relation between the two rotations. That is, there is
an edge from ρu to ρv in the rotation poset because of Rule 1 in Remark 2.8. In our construction,
however, the edge is present in the rotation poset because of Rule 2 in Remark 2.8 and the pair of
agents behind the rule is (mc,v, wc,u) which, incidentally, is not a stable pair of the instance.
Notation 3.1. For a fixed poset P, element v ∈ P, and edge coloring φ, Cv ⊆ Z+ denotes the
set of colors associated with v. That is, Cv contains the set of colors of edges incident to v.
12 We
denote bv = |Cv|, the number of such colors. We choose an arbitrary cyclic ordering of Cv, and
denote this ordering by piv : [bv]→ Cv. That is, piv(1) is the “first” color in Cv, piv(2) is the second,
and so on. Finally, given a color c ∈ Cv, we denote its “next” and “previous” colors in piv by c+
and c−, respectively. That is, if c = piv(i), then c+ = piv(i+ 1) and c− = piv(i− 1).
Lemma 3.2. Let I = I(P, φ) be the SM instance created by ConstructInstance(H(P), φ). Let µ0
and µz denote the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings of I respectively. Then
µ0 = {{mc,v, wc,v} | c ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]}
and
µz =
{{
mc,v, wc+,v
} ∣∣ c ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]} = {{mc−,v, wc,v} ∣∣ c ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]}
where c+ and c− are respectively the colors to c’s next and and previous colors in the (cyclic)
ordering piv of Cv.
Proof. In the preference lists created by ConstructInstance, the first choice of each man mc,v is wc,v
(Lines 12–14). Thus the matching µ0 is a perfect matching assigning each man to his most preferred
partner, which is clearly stable. On the other hand, the first choice of each woman wc,v is mc−,v
(Lines 20–29). Again, no two women have the same first choice, so µz is the woman-optimal stable
matching.
12In later sections, we include additional colors in Cv. This modification does not affect the correctness of the
algorithm.
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Algorithm 1 ConstructInstance(H = (V,E), φ) where H = H(P) is the Hasse diagram of poset P
and φ is an edge coloring of H that uses colors from Z+. The algorithm constructs an SM instance
I(P, φ) whose rotation poset is isomorphic to P.
1: Assume V = {1, 2, . . . , p}.
2: for all e = (u, v) ∈ E do
3: add φ(e) to the sets Cu and Cv
4: end for
5: for v = 1 to p do
6: if |Cv| < 2 then
7: add colors 1 and/or 2 to Cv so |Cv| = 2
8: end if
9: end for
10: M ← {mc,1 | i ∈ C1} ∪ {mc,2 | c ∈ C2} ∪ . . . ∪ {mc,p | c ∈ Cp}
11: W ← {wc,1 | i ∈ C1} ∪ {wc,2 | c ∈ C2} ∪ . . . ∪ {wc,p | c ∈ Cp}
12: for all mc,v ∈M do
13: add mc,v and wc,v to each other’s preference lists
14: end for
15: for all e = (u, v) ∈ E do
16: c← φ((u, v))
17: add mc,v to the front of wc,u’s preference list
18: add wc,u to the end of mc,v’s preference list
19: end for
20: for v = 1 to p do
21: let piv be some ordering of the colors in Cv
22: {We shall refer to the ith element in the ordering as piv(i) and use bv to denote |Cv|.}
23: ρv ← (mpiv(1),v, wpiv(1),v), (mpiv(2),v, wpiv(2),v), . . . , (mpiv(bv),v, wpiv(bv),v)
24: {Note that ρv is a circular list.}
25: for i = 1 to bv do
26: add wpiv(i+1),v to the end of mpiv(i),v’s preference list
27: add mpiv(i),v to the beginning of wpiv(i+1),v’s preference list
28: end for
29: end for
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1m2,2
m1,1 : w1,1 w2,1
m2,1 : w2,1 w1,1
m1,2 : w1,2 w1,1 w2,2
m2,2 : w2,2 w1,2
m1,3 : w1,3 w1,1 w2,3
m2,3 : w2,3 w1,3
m1,4 : w1,4 w1,2 w1,3 w2,4
m2,4 : w2,4 w1,4
w1,1 : m2,1 m1,2 m1,3 m1,1
w2,1 : m1,1 m2,1
w1,2 : m2,2 m1,4 m1,2
w2,2 : m1,2 m2,2
w1,3 : m2,3 m1,4 m1,3
w2,3 : m1,3 m2,3
w1,4 : m2,4 m1,4
w2,4 : m1,4 m2,4
Figure 2: On the left is the Hasse diagram of a poset P with four elements whose edges are all colored 1
(indicated by green). Thus C1 = C2 = C3 = C4 = {1, 2}. On the right is the graph corresponding to SM
instance created by ConstructInstance, while the preference lists of the agents are shown below. The men are
represented by nodes outlined in blue and the women by nodes outlined in red. The colors on the edges
indicate preference. The blue and red edges correspond to acceptable partners added in Lines 12–14 and
Lines 20–29 respectively. The green edges correspond acceptable partners added in Lines 15–19 and meant
to enforce the (also green) edges of the Hasse diagram of P. The man-optimal matching consists of the
blue edges, while the woman-optimal matching consists of the red edges. The rotations in the instance are
alternating red-blue cycles. Notice that no green edge corresponds to a stable pair, but the green edges
enforce the partial order of rotations in R(I). For example, rotations ρ2 and ρ3 are only exposed in a stable
matching µ in which w1,1 is matched with m2,1 (her most preferred partner)—i.e., a matching in which ρ1
has been eliminated.
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Remark 3.3. For our discussion below, it is helpful to also express µ0 and µz in terms of the
circular lists ρv for v ∈ [p]. Recall that bv = |Cv|, and piv : [bv]→ Cv is a cyclic ordering of colors in
Cv with piv(i) indicating the color in the ith position of the ordering. Then we have
µ0 =
p⋃
v=1
{
(mpiv(i),j , wpiv(i),j)
∣∣ i ∈ [bv]}
and
µz =
p⋃
v=1
{
(mpiv(i),j , wpiv(i+1),j)
∣∣ i ∈ [bv]} = p⋃
v=1
{
(mpiv(i−1),j , wpiv(i),j)
∣∣ i ∈ [bv]} .
Lemma 3.4. Let I = I(P, φ) be the SM instance created by ConstructInstance(H(P), φ). Let
ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρp be the circular lists defined in the algorithm. Without loss of generality, assume
1, 2, . . . , p is a topological ordering of the vertices of H(P). Then for v = 1, . . . , p, ρj is a rotation
exposed in the stable matching µv−1 so that µv = µv−1/ρv is also a stable matching of I. Moreover,
µz = µp so the set {ρv | v = 1, . . . , p} contains all the rotations of I.
Proof. We prove the first part of the lemma by induction on v. Notice that for every man mc,v,
his most preferred partner is his man-optimal stable partner, wc,v, while his least preferred is his
woman-optimal stable partner, wc+,v. Any women added by the algorithm in Lines 15 to 19 are
between these two women. Consider vertex 1 in H. There are no edges entering 1 because it is the
first vertex in the topological ordering. Thus, Lines 15–19 do not add any women to mc,1’s list for
any c ∈ C1. That is, mc,1’s list consists of just wc,1 followed by wc+,1. Therefore,
ρ1 = (mpi1(1),1, wpi1(1),1), (mpi1(2),1, wpi1(2),1), . . . , (mpi1(b1),1, wpi1(b1),1)
is a rotation exposed in µ0, hence µ1 = µ0/ρ1 is a stable matching of I.
Now assume that for v = 1 to j − 1, ρv is a rotation exposed in the stable matching µv−1. Thus,
µj−1 is a stable matching of I. Let us now prove that ρj is a rotation exposed in µj−1. First, we
note that
µj−1 =
j−1⋃
v=1
{
(mpiv(i),v, wpiv(i+1),v)
∣∣ i ∈ [bv]} ∪ p⋃
v=j
{
(mpiv(i),v, wpiv(i),v)
∣∣ i ∈ [bv]} .
That is, every mc,v is matched to his woman-optimal stable partner if v ≤ j − 1 and to his
man-optimal stable partner if v ≥ j.
Next, consider mc,j , c ∈ Cj . His preference list consists of wc,j , followed by zero or more women
added by Lines 15–19, and ends with wc+,j . The women added by Lines 15–19 are of the form wc,u
where (u, j) is an edge of H and c = φ((u, j)). But u precedes j in H so it follows by the inductive
hypothesis that wc,u is matched to mc−,u—her woman-optimal stable partner—in µj−1. Thus, she
does not prefer mc,j to her current partner in µj−1. But wc+j does prefer mc,j—her woman-optimal
stable partner—to her current partner mc+,j in µj−1. Hence,
ρj = (mpij(1),j , wpij(1),j), (mpij(2),j , wpij(2),j), · · · , (mpij(bj),j , wpij(bj),j)
is a rotation exposed in µj−1 so µj = µj−1/ρj is a stable matching of I.
By induction, the first part of the lemma is true. It is easy to see that µz = µp, which was
obtained by eliminating all the rotations in the set {ρv | v = 1, . . . , p}. Since µz can only be obtained
by eliminating all rotations in R(I), it follows that R(I) = {ρv | v = 1, . . . , p}, as desired.
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Remark 3.5. For each v ∈ [p], let Av = {mc,v | c ∈ Cv} ∪ {wc,v | c ∈ Cv}. Lemma 3.4’s characteri-
zation of the rotations of I means that every agent in Av is part of only one rotation: ρv. Moreover,
eliminating ρv will shift each agent from their man-optimal stable partner to their woman-optimal
stable partner.
The above property highlights the simplicity of SM instance I. In every stable matching of I,
each agent is matched to either their man-optimal or their woman-optimal stable partner. But we
note that it does not imply that a matching where every agent is paired to either their man-optimal
or their woman-optimal stable partner is a stable matching of I. For example, for any u, v ∈ [p], if
u precedes v in P, then there is no stable matching where the agents in Au are matched to their
man-optimal stable partners while the agents in Av are matched to their woman-optimal stable
partners.
Remark 3.6. We also note that Lemma 3.4 applies to every topological ordering τ of the vertices
of H. Let τ(i) denote the ith element in the ordering. Let σ0 = µ0. Then for i = 1, . . . , p, ρτ(i) is
exposed in the stable matching σi−1 and σi = σi−1/ρτ(i).
Lemma 3.7. Let P be a finite poset, H(P) = (V,E) its Hasse diagram, and φ an arbitrary edge
coloring of H(P). Let I = I(P, φ) be the SM instance created by ConstructInstance(H(P), φ). Then
the relation f(v) = ρv is an isomorphism between P and R(I).
Proof. We have already established that P and R = R(I) have the same number of elements. Let
v′, v be elements of P. We will now argue that v′ is a predecessor of v in P if and only if ρv′ is a
predecessor of ρv in R.
Assume v′ is a predecessor of v. Then there exists a sequence u0 = v′, u1, u2, . . . , ur−1, ur with
ur = v, such that uj is an immediate predecessor of uj+1 for j = 0, . . . , r − 1. Let cj = φ((uj , uj+1),
the color assigned to edge (uj , uj+1) in H(P). Then, by construction, each wcj ,uj is in the preference
list of mcj ,uj+1 , and mcj ,uj+1 prefers wcj ,uj to his woman-optimal stable partner. He is also in wcj ,uj ’s
preference list and she prefers him to her man-optimal stable partner. By Lemma 3.4 the only
rotation that contains wcj ,uj is ρuj . Thus, in order for ρuj+1 to be exposed in a stable matching
µ, ρuj must be eliminated. Since this is true for j = 0, . . . , r − 1, it follows that ρv′ has to be
eliminated before ρv is exposed. In other words, ρv′ precedes ρv in R. By the same argument, if v
is a predecessor of v′ then ρv precedes ρv′ in R.
So the only case we have to consider is when v′ and v are incomparable in P . In this case, there
is a topological orderings τ1 and τ2 such that v
′ occurs before v in τ1, while v occurs before v in τ2.
From Lemma 3.4 and Remark 3.6, there is a stable matching where ρ′v is eliminated but not ρv and
another stable matching where ρv is eliminated but not ρv′ . Thus, ρv and ρv′ are not comparable in
R(I).
Theorem 3.8. Let P be a finite poset and H(P) = (V,E) be its Hasse diagram with p = |V |, and
q = |E|. Then I = I(P, φ)—the SM instance created by ConstructInstance(H(P), φ)—realizes P . It
has O(p+ q) agents and it can be constructed in O(p+ q) time.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, we know that I realizes P . ConstructInstance creates at most 2×max(2,deg(v))
agents for each v ∈ [p]. Thus, the total number of agents is at most 2(2p+ 2q) = O(p+ q). Creating
Cv for v ∈ [p] takes O(deg(v)+1) time, so all lists are formed in time O(
∑
v∈V (deg(v)+1)) = O(p+q).
Creating the agents, and adding their man-optimal and woman-optimal stable partners take O(p+q)
time in total. Finally, adding their acceptable partners in Lines 15–19 takes O(q) time. Thus, the
total running time of ConstructInstance is O(p+ q).
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Some of the agents in the SM instance created by ConstructInstance have incomplete preference
lists. If desired, each incomplete preference list can be completed by appending its missing agents
at the end of the list. By Corollary 2.14, the SM instance will realize the same poset.
Corollary 3.9. Let P be a finite poset and H(P) = (V,E) be its Hasse diagram with p = |V |,
and q = |E|. Then there exists an SM instance I(P) of size n = 2p that realizes P, and I can be
constructed in time O(p+ q) given H(P).
Proof. Let φ assign each edge of H(P) the color 1. Then Cv = {1, 2} for each v ∈ [p]. The instance
I(P, φ) realizes P . It has n men and n women where n = 2p and can be constructed in time O(p+q)
time.
Remark 3.10. The runtime of our construction in Corollary 3.9 matches that of Irving and
Leather’s construction in [22]. Our construction also yields an instance I whose size (i.e., number of
agents) is dependent only on p whereas Irving and Leather’s is dependent on q and the number
of bottom and top nodes of H(P). Thus, our construction gives a quadratic improvement when
q = Ω(p2) (for example when H(P) is a directed complete bipartite graph).
4 k-Bounded and k-Attribute Preferences
In Corollary 3.9, we showed that applying our generic construction, ConstructInstance, with the
with the trivial edge coloring φ(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E yields an SM instance with a small number
of agents (n = O(p)). In this section, we show that by taking φ to be a proper edge coloring13,
ConstructInstance computes an SM instance in which all preference lists have length at most 3—i.e.,
a 3-bounded instance. Thus we can apply Theorem 3.8 to show that for any finite poset P , there is
a 3-bounded SM instance realizing P. A proper edge coloring of any graph H can be computed in
linear time, so the 3-bounded SM instance realizing P can be computed in linear time as well.
Next, we show that the 3-bounded instances constructed by ConstructInstance as above can be
efficiently transformed into 6-attribute instances realizing the same rotation poset. Thus, 6-attribute
preferences realize all finite posets. More generally, our reduction shows that for any k-bounded SM
instance, there is a 2k-attribute instance in which all agents’ rankings of their first k acceptable
partners are the same as the k-bounded instance.
4.1 k-Bounded Preferences
Let φ be an edge coloring of a directed graph H = (V,E). We say that φ is a proper in-coloring
of H if for every vertex v ∈ V and any two edges e and e′ entering v, φ(e) 6= φ(e′). Similarly, φ
is a proper out-coloring of H if for every vertex v ∈ V and any two edges e and e′ leaving v,
φ(e) 6= φ(e′). We then say that φ is a super coloring of H if it is both a proper in- and out-
coloring. The following proposition shows that given a proper in-coloring (respectively, out-coloring),
ConstructInstance produces an SM instance in which the men (respectively, women) have preference
lists of length at most 3.
Proposition 4.1. Let H = H(P) be the Hasse diagram of poset P and φ be an edge coloring of H.
Let I = I(P, φ) be the SM instance created by ConstructInstance(H,φ). The men’s preference lists
in I have length at most 3 if and only if φ is a proper in-coloring while the women’s pereference
lists in I have length at most 3 if and only if φ is a proper out-coloring.
13Recall that an edge coloring is proper if for every vertex v, no two edges incident to v have the same color.
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Proof. Consider an agent mc,v with c ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]. By construction, the length of mc,v’s preference
list is determined by the edges entering v that φ has colored c. In particular, mc,v’s preference list
has length `+ 2 if and only if there are ` such edges. Thus, mc,v’s preference list has length 3 if and
only if φ assigned at most one edge entering v the color c. This property holds for all men if and
only if φ is a proper in-coloring.
Next, consider an agent wc,v with c ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]. The length of wc,v’s preference list is determined
by the edges leaving v that φ colors c. Using the same argument as above, we conclude that all
women’s preference list have length at most 3 if and only if φ is a proper out-coloring.
We can now prove that 3-bounded SM instances can realize any finite poset.
Theorem 4.2. Let P be a finite poset. Then there is an SM instance I(P) ∈ Bound(3) that realizes
P. Moreover, given the Hasse diagram H = H(P) with p vertices and q edges, I(P) has O(p+ q)
agents and can be constructed in O(p+ q) time. Thus, all finite posets can be efficiently realized by
instances in Bound(k) for any k ≥ 3.
Proof. According to Proposition 4.1, it suffices to find φ that is a super coloring of H so that
ConstructInstance produces a 3-bounded SM instance. So let φ assign edges of H pair-wise distinct
colors from [q]. It takes O(p+ q) time to create φ. ConstructInstance will run in O(p+ q) time to
create an SM instance I(P, φ) that is 3-bounded and has O(p+ q) agents.
4.2 k-Attribute Preferences
Recall that for an SM instance in Attr(k), every agent a is assigned a profile (~a, ϕa) such that
~a ∈ Rk and ϕa : Rk → R. Agent a’s preference list is then derived by applying ϕa to all agents b of
the opposite gender and ranking them in descending order according to ϕa(~b). Below, we show how
an instance I ∈ Bound(3) can be converted into an instance I ′ ∈ Attr(6) such that I and I ′ have
isomorphic rotation posets. Since we know from Theorem 4.2 that every finite poset can be realized
by some instance in Bound(3), the same holds for Attr(6).
The idea behind our construction of the profiles is the following. Consider an embedding
of the set W into R6 such that W is in convex position14 (i.e., no ~w lies inside of the convex
hull of W \ {~w}). Let XW ⊆ R6 denote the convex hull of W . Suppose the points ~w1, ~w2, ~w3
form a 3-face of the polytope XW . Then there exists a linear function ϕ : R
6 → R such that
ϕ(~w1) = ϕ(~w2) = ϕ(~w3) > ϕ(~w) for all ~w ∈ W , ~w 6= ~w1, ~w2, ~w3. By choosing a sufficiently small
perturbation ϕˆ of ϕ, we can ensure that in fact
ϕˆ(~w1) > ϕˆ(~w2) > ϕˆ(~w3) > ϕˆ(~w).
Thus, if a man m ∈M takes ϕm = ϕˆ, he will rank w1, w2, w3 as his top three choices. Our argument
is to show that for any SM instance I ∈ Bound(3), there exist embeddings of W and M in R6
such that every triple of women (respectively, men) form a 3-face as above. Thus, each man m can
choose ϕm so that his first (at most) 3 preferred partners according to ϕm agree with his preference
list in I. From this, it is easy to show that the constructed instance in Attr(6) has precisely the
same stable matchings as I.
Remark 4.3. Our construction of 6-attribute instances from 3-bounded instances generalizes the
technique used in Bhatnagar et al.’s construction of 3-attribute preferences that realize star posets [1].
They further describe a modification showing that, in fact, the same rotation posets can be realized
14We abuse notation and associate W with the set of embedded points in R6.
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m1,1
m1,1 : w1,1 w2,1
m2,1 : w2,1 w1,1
m1,2 : w1,2 w1,1 w3,2
m3,2 : w3,2 w1,2
m2,3 : w2,3 w2,1 w4,3
m4,3 : w4,3 w2,3
m3,4 : w3,4 w3,2 w4,4
m4,4 : w4,4 w4,3 w3,4
w1,1 : m2,1 m1,2 m1,1
w2,1 : m1,1 m2,3 m2,1
w1,2 : m3,2 m1,2
w3,2 : m1,2 m3,4 m3,2
w2,3 : m4,3 m2,3
w4,3 : m2,3 m4,4 m4,3
w3,4 : m4,4 m3,4
w4,4 : m3,4 m4,4
Figure 3: The 3-bounded instance (left) formed by taking φ to be a proper edge coloing of the Hasse diagram
(left) of a poset P.
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m1,1
w1,1
Figure 4: We can associate simplicial complexes M (left) and W (right) for the 3-bounded SM instance
depicted in Figure 3. Each face in the complexes corresponds to a set of agents appearing together in some
agent’s preference lists. For example, the men {m1,1,m2,1,m1,2} form a face on the left, because they all
appear on w2,1’s preference list. For this example, both complexes are planar. Therefore, they can be
embedded in convex position on the surface of the sphere in R3. Thus, the rotation poset can be realized
in the 3-attribute model. In general, Gale’s construction implies that any (k − 1)-dimensional complex (in
particular, those associated with a k-bounded SM instance) can be embedded in convex position in R2k.
in the 2-attribute model. We believe that a similar dimension reduction argument may allow one to
reduce the dimension of our general embedding, thus showing that k-attribute instances realize all
finite posets for some k < 6.
The main technical tool we require is a result of Gale [16], who showed that the cyclic polytopes
in 2`-dimensional space are `-neighborly.
Definition 4.4. For any positive integers ` and n, consider the vertex set V2`,n ⊆ R2` defined by
V2`,n =
{
(i, i2, i3, . . . , i2`)
∣∣∣ i ∈ [n]} .
Then the 2`-dimensional cylic polytope of order n, X2`,n, is defined to be the convex hull of
V2`,n.
15
Gale [16] showed that the 2`-dimensional cyclic polytopes have the remarkable property of being
`-neighborly : every subset V ⊂ V2`,n of size ` forms an `-face of X2`,n. More specifically, Gale proved
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 (cf. [16, Theorem 1]). Let X2`,n be a cyclic polytope and let V = {~v1, ~v2, . . . , ~v`} be
any set of ` distinct vertices in X2`,n. Then there exists a linear function ϕ : R
2` → R such that for
all ~vi, ~vj ∈ V , (1) we have ϕ(~vi) = ϕ(~vj), and (2) for all vertices ~v /∈ V , ϕ(~v) < ϕ(~vi).
Gale [16] constructs the function ϕ above as follows. For each ~vj ∈ V , write ~vj = (ij , i2j , . . . , i2`j ),
and consider the function
p(t) =
∏`
j=1
(t− ij)2 = β0 + β1t+ · · ·+ β2`−1t2`−1 + t2`. (1)
15The argument below implies that V2`,n are in convex position, hence the set vertices of X2`,n is precisely V2`,n
23
Setting ~β = (β1, β2, . . . , β2`−1, 1) ∈ R2`, a straightforward argument shows that ϕ(~x) = −~x · ~β gives
ϕ(~vj) = β0 for all ~vj , and ϕ(~v) < β0 for every vertex ~v /∈ V . In particular, computing the vector
~β can be performed in time O(`2) by simply performing the multiplication in (1). By choosing a
sufficiently small perturbation of the function ϕ of the conclusion of Lemma 4.5, we obtain the
following corollary. We give a self-contained proof, in particular to demonstrate that the desired
functions ϕ can be efficiently constructed.
Corollary 4.6. Let X6,n be a cyclic polytope and let V = {~v1, ~v2, ~v3} be any set of 3 distinct
vertices in X6,n. Then there exists a linear function ϕ : R
6 → R such that
ϕ(~v1) > ϕ(~v2) > ϕ(~v3) > ϕ(~v)
for all vertices ~v /∈ V . The function ϕ can be computed in constant time from the set V .
Proof. In order to give an explicit construction of a function ϕ as in Corollary 4.6, consider the
function
q(t) = (t− i1)2(t− i2 + δ2)2(t− i3 + δ3)2 = α0 + α1t+ · · ·+ α5t5 + t6, (2)
where δ2, δ3 > 0 are constants to be chosen later. Setting ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , α5, 1) we obtain
q(j) = ~α · (j, j2, . . . , j5, 1) + α0.
Thus, it suffices to compute suitable constants δ2, δ3 such that
q(i1) < q(i2) < q(i3) < q(i) (3)
for all i 6= i1, i2, i3 (where as above, we take ~vj = (ij , i2j , . . . , i6j )). Indeed, then taking ϕ(~v) = −~α · ~v
gives the desired result. Observe that from the definition of q, we immediately obtain
q(i1) = 0
q(i2) = (i2 − i1)2(δ22)(i2 − i3 − δ3)2
q(i3) = (i3 − i1)2(i3 − i2 − δ2)2(δ23)
q(i) = (i− i1)2(i− i2 + δ2)2(i− i3 + δ3)2.
Taking δ2, δ3 ≤ 1/4 (so that, for example, (i− δ2)2 > 1/2), we obtain the following inequalities:
0 < q(i2) ≤ δ22n4 (4)
1
2
δ23 ≤ q(i3) ≤ n4δ23 (5)
1
4
< q(i). (6)
Thus, by taking δ2 =
1
4n4
and δ3 =
1
2n2
, we obtain (4) < (5) < (6), hence Equation (3) is satisfied.
Since (2) contains O(1) terms, the coefficients α can be computed in time O(1) from V . This gives
the desired result.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.7. Let P be a poset whose Hasse diagram H(P) has p vertices and q edges. There is
an SM instance I ′′(P) ∈ Attr(6) with O(p+ q) agents that realizes P. Moreover, given H(P), the
profiles of the agents in I ′′(P) can also be computed in O(p+ q) time. Thus, all finite posets can be
efficiently realized by instances in Attr(k) for any k ≥ 6.
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Proof. Let I = I(P) be the 3-bounded instance constructed by ConstructInstance(H(P), φ), where φ
is any proper edge coloring of H. We create an Attr(6) instance I ′′ = I ′′(P) with exactly the same
agents as I(P) as follows. Let n be the number of men (and women) in I. Arbitrarily label the men
and women as m1,m2, . . . ,mn and w1, w2, . . . , wn respectively. For each mi ∈M and wi ∈W , we
assign a profile vector in R6 corresponding to the ith vertex of the 6-dimensional cyclic polytope
X6,n:
~mi, ~wi = (i, i
2, i3, i4, i5, i6).
Now let Pmi and Pwi denote mi’s and wi’s preference lists in I. We assume that |Pmi | = |Pwi | = 3 by
possibly adding another arbitrary person to the end of these preference lists. For Pmi = ws1 , ws2 , ws3
assign the profile function ϕmi to be the function asserted by Corollary 4.6 such that
ϕmi(~ws1) > ϕmi(~ws2) > ϕmi(~ws3) > ϕmi(~w) for all w ∈W \ Pmi .
Thus, the preference list of mi in I
′′ consists of the same list in I followed by other women. The
women’s preference lists are defined analogously. Again, the preference list of each woman wi in I
′′
consists of the same list in I followed by other men. By Corollary 2.14, I ′′ realizes the same rotation
poset as I, namely P.
Finally computing I takes time O(p+ q). Given I, each profile (a, ϕa) can be computed in time
O(1) by Corollary 4.6. Therefore, the overall runtime is O(p+ q), as desired.
Remark 4.8. The construction we describe generalizes in the following way: given any SM instance
I ∈ Bound(k), we can construct an instance I ′ ∈ Attr(2k) such that each preference list in I ′ is
obtained by appending the missing agents to the end of the incomplete preference lists in I. We
only give full details for the k = 3 case, as this is sufficient to prove Theorem 4.7.
5 k-List Preferences
For this section, we will prove that (2,∞)-list (or, equivalently, (∞, 2)-list) SM instances realize
every finite poset. We will start by creating an SM instance using ConstructInstance where the
incomplete preference lists of each man is a sublist of one of two distinct complete lists of women.
(Interestingly, the incomplete preference lists of the women are sublists of also two distinct complete
lists of men.) We then assign the complete lists as preference lists for the men and append the
women’s preference lists with missing men so they become complete. Hence, the men can be divided
into two groups and the men in each group have the same preference list while the women can be
divided into any number of groups with the same property.
To arrive at the right SM instance for poset P , we will have to label the vertices of H = H(P)—
the Hasse diagram of P—in a particular way and tweak how ConstructInstance is implemented. We
describe the specifications and their implication below.
• Label the vertices of H so that (p, p − 1, . . . , 1) is a topological ordering. This means every
(directed) edge (u, v) has u > v.
• For each edge (u, v) of H, let φ((u, v)) = u. Thus, φ is a proper in-coloring since all edges
entering a particular node are assigned different colors.
• Add the color p + 1 to Cv for every v ∈ [p]. Such an addition creates 2p more agents and
expands the rotations, but does not affect the fact that if the input to the algorithm is (H,φ),
the output I(P, φ) still realizes P.
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• Process the edges in E in Lines 15 to 19 in lexicographically decreasing order. Thus, if
a woman’s preference list contains men different from her woman- and man-optimal stable
partners, their subscripts are lexicographically increasing.
• Finally, for each v ∈ [p], let piv be an ordering of Cv so that the colors are listed from smallest
to largest. Notice that p+ 1 is the last color on this list.
We now analyze the preference lists of the agents.
Lemma 5.1. For each man mc,v, c ∈ Cv and v ∈ [p], the preference list of mc,v is
mc,v : wc,v wc+,v or mc,v : wc,v wc,c wc+,v.
Furthermore, if c 6= p+ 1, the subscripts of the women in his list are lexicographically increasing. If
c = p+ 1, then mc,v’s preference list has length two, and the subscripts of the women in his list are
lexicographically decreasing
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, mc,v’s preference list has length at most 3 since φ is a proper in-coloring.
If he has a woman on his list different from his man-optimal and woman-optimal stable partners,
then there is an edge (u, v) colored c so that wc,u is his second choice. But by the way φ is defined
c = u. Thus, the preference list of mc,v is of the form described in the proposition.
By our choice of piv, if c 6= p+ 1, then c < c+. Furthermore, if wc,c is mc,v’s second choice, then
v < c because (u, v) = (c, v) is an edge of the graph. Thus, when c 6= p+ 1, the subscripts of the
women in mc,v’s list are lexicographically increasing. On the other hand, mp+1,v’s preference list has
length 2 since there is no edge assigned the color p+ 1. Furthermore, c+ < p+ 1 so the subscripts
of the women in mp+1,v’s list are lexicographically decreasing.
Lemma 5.2. For each woman wc,v, c ∈ Cv and v ∈ [p], the preference list of wc,v is
wc,v : mc−,v mc,v when c 6= v and wc,c : mc−,c ({mc,x | (c, x) ∈ E}) mc,c otherwise.
Here, ({mc,x | (c, x) ∈ E}) orders the men so that their subscripts are lexicographically increasing.
If the subscripts of the men in wc,v’s list are not lexicographically increasing then c = minCv so
that c− = p+ 1.
Proof. From Lemma 5.1, we know that only women of the form wc,c can be part of a man’s preference
list where she is neither his man-optimal nor woman-optimal stable partner. Thus, for wc,v with
c 6= v, her preference list consists of her woman-optimal stable partner, mc−,v, followed by her
man-optimal stable partner, mc,v. But for wc,c, she can have other men in her preference list and they
are of the form mc,x such that (c, x) ∈ E. Since these men were added to the front of wc,x’s list so
that their subscripts are lexicographically decreasing, the sublist ({mc,x | (c, x) ∈ E}) has subscripts
that are lexicographically increasing. Furthermore, the subscript of mc,c is lexicographically larger
than all the men because if (c, x) ∈ E then c > x.
The last observation follows from the fact that if c = minCv, then c
− = p + 1 but when
c 6= minCv, then c− < c because of how we chose piv.
Theorem 5.3. Let P be a finite poset. There is an SM instance I(P) that realizes P such that
every man’s preference list is a sublist of two complete lists of women and every women’s preference
list is a sublist of two complete lists of men. Moreover, given the Hasse diagram H = H(P) with p
vertices and q edges, I(P) has O(p+ q) agents and can be constructed in O(p+ q) time.
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m4,4
GM1

m4,4 : w4,4 w5,4
m4,2 : w4,2 w4,4 w5,2
m2,2 : w2,2 w4,2
m4,3 : w4,3 w4,4 w5,3
m3,3 : w3,3 w4,3
m3,1 : w3,1 w3,3 w5,1
m2,1 : w2,1 w2,2 w3,1
m1,4 : w1,4 w4,4
GM2

m5,4 : w5,4 w1,4
m5,3 : w5,3 w3,3
m5,2 : w5,2 w4,2
m5,1 : w5,1 w2,1
GW1

w4,4 : m1,4 m4,2 m4,3 m4,4
w5,4 : m4,4 m5,4
w4,3 : m3,3 m4,3
w5,3 : m4,3 m5,3
w4,2 : m2,2 m4,2
w5,2 : m4,2 m5,2
w3,1 : m2,1 m3,1
w5,1 : m3,1 m5,1
GW2

w1,4 : m5,4 m1,4
w3,3 : m5,3 m3,1 m3,3
w2,2 : m5,2 m2,1 m2,2
w2,1 : m5,1 m2,1
LM1 : w1,4 w2,1 w2,2 w3,1 w3,3 w4,2 w4,3 w4,4 w5,1 w5,2 w5,3 w5,4
LM2 : w5,1 w5,2 w5,3 w5,4 w1,4 w2,1 w2,2 w3,1 w3,3 w4,2 w4,3 w4,4
LW1 : m1,4 m2,1 m2,2 m3,1 m3,3 m4,2 m4,3 m4,4 m5,1 m5,2 m5,3 m5,4
LW2 : m5,1 m5,2 m5,3 m5,4 m1,4 m2,1 m2,2 m3,1 m3,3 m4,2 m4,3 m4,4
Figure 5: Illustration of the instance created by ConstructInstance for the edge-colored Hasse diagram depicted
on the left. The vertices labeled 4, 3, and 2 correspond to the colors blue, red, and green, respectively. Orange
is used to depict the “extra” color 5. The white nodes in ρ4 correspond to the color 1 being added in Lines 5–9
of ConstructInstance. The incomplet preference lists of the agents are indicated below the figures. The
“master” preference lists for the men and women are indicated on the bottom.
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Proof. Let I(P) be the SM instance constructed by the specific implementation of the algorithm
ConstructInstance(H,φ) described above. Let the first group of men beGM1 = {mc,v | c 6= p+ 1, v ∈ [p]}
and the second group be GM2 = M \ GM1. Similarly, denote the first group of women as
GW1 = {wc,v | c 6= min color in Cv, v ∈ [p]} and the second group as GW2 = W \GW1.
Set the first list for men LM1 as the complete list of the women W in which the subscripts of
the women are lexicographically increasing. Set the second list LM2 as the complete list of the
women in which the women in {wp+1,v | v ∈ [p]} appear first followed by the remaining women. For
each subgroup, the subscripts of the women are again lexicographically increasing. (See Figure 5).
Let the lists for women LW1 and LW2 be constructed analogously as LM1 and LM2 respectively.
By Lemma 5.1, the preference list of every man in GM1 is a sublist of LM1 while those in GM2
is a sublist of LM2. Similarly, by Lemma 5.2, every woman in GW1 and GW2 have preference lists
that are sublists of LW1 and LW2 respectively.
Since I(P) is the output of ConstructInstance(H,φ), it realizes P. We also noted that adding
p+ 1 to each Cv increases the number of agents by 2p so I(P) still has O(p+ q) agents. The only
detail we have to verify is the time it takes to implement the specifications on top of the O(p+ q)
running time of ConstructInstance. Topologically sorting H takes O(p+ q) time. Properly coloring
each edge (u, v) of H so that φ((u, v)) = u takes O(q) time. Adding p+ 1 to each Cv takes O(p)
time. Processing the edges (u, v) in E in Lines 15 to 19 in lexicographically decreasing order can be
done by radix sort. There are q edges and u, v ∈ [p] so the radix sort can be performed in O(p+ q)
time. Finally, we can simultaneously sort all Cv’s by creating pairs (v, c) for each c ∈ Cv and sorting
them lexicographically using radix sort. We note that |Cv| ≤ deg(v) + 2 so
∑
v |Cv| ≤ 2q + 2p. It
follows that there are O(p+ q) pairs to sort. Since v ∈ [p] and c ∈ [p+ 1], radix sort will again take
O(p+ q) time. Thus, even with the five extra specifications, I(P) can be constructed in O(p+ q)
time.
Let us now consider the SM instance IL(P) obtained from the SM instance I(P) by assigning
each man in GM1 the list LM1 and each man in GM2 the list LM2. For each woman, let her
preference list be the one in I(P) followed by an arbitrary ordering of the missing men.
Lemma 5.4. The man-optimal stable matching of IL(P) is µ∗ = {(mc,v, wc,v) | c ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]}.
That is, IL(P) and I(P) have the same man-optimal stable matching.
Proof. Let S = LW1, the sequence of men whose subscripts are lexicographically increasing. Let S`
denote the `th man in the sequence. We run the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm using S. In
particular, we let each man S` make a series of proposals and get engaged before we move on to
S`+1. Of course it’s possible that at the later stages of the algorithm S` becomes free because his
fiancee rejects him. We shall show though that this situation never happens.
Consider S1 = mc,v, the man with the lexicographically least subscript among all the men. Since
each v ∈ [p] has |Cv| ≥ 2, we know c < p + 1. Thus, the preference list of mc,v is LM1, and the
first woman on LM1 is wc,v because the subscripts of the women in LM1 are also lexicographically
increasing. No one has proposed to wc,v yet so she will accept mc,v’s proposal. Assume that for
`′ ≤ `− 1, S`′ is temporarily matched to his partner in µ∗. We will show that the same is true for
S`.
Suppose S` = mc,j such that c < p + 1. Again, his preference list is LM1. He will propose
first to women of the form ws,t such that (s, t) < (c, j). By assumption, ws,t is matched to ms,t.
According to Lemma 5.2, the only men ws,t will prefer to ms,t will be mp+1,t or have subscripts
lexicographically less than ms,t’s. In other words, ws,t does not prefer mc,j to ms,t so she will reject
him. Hence, mc,j will eventually propose to wc,j who will accept his proposal because she is free.
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Suppose S` = mp+1,1. His preference list is LM2 so the first woman on his list is wp+1,1. He will
of course propose to her and she will accept it because no one has proposed to her yet.
Finally, let S` = mp+1,j such that j > 1. Again, his preference list is LM2. He will first propose
to women wp+1,v such that v < j. By assumption, wp+1,v is matched to mp+1,v. According to
Lemma 5.2, the only man that wp+1,v prefers to mp+1,v is of the form mc,v with c 6= p+ 1. Thus,
wp+1,v will reject mp+1,j ’s proposal. He will eventually propose to wp+1,j and she will accept the
proposal because she is free.
By induction, the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm will match all men mc,v to wc,v so µ
∗
is the man-optimal stable matching of IL(P). By Lemma 3.2, µ∗ is also the man-optimal stable
matching of I(P).
Theorem 5.5. Let P be a finite poset. There is an SM instance IL(P) with (2,∞)-list preferences
that realizes P. Moreover, given the Hasse diagram H = H(P) with p vertices and q edges, IL(P)
has O(p+ q) agents and can be constructed in O((p+ q)2) time.
Proof. Consider IL(P), which clearly has (2,∞)-list preferences. It was constructed from I(P)
which realizes P. In particular, the women’s preference lists in IL(P) is exactly like that in I(P)
followed by an arbitrary ordering of the missing men. We will now argue that the two instances have
identical shortlists. If so, by Corollary 2.14, they have identical rotation posets and, consequently,
IL(P) also realizes P.
We showed in Lemma 5.4 that IL(P) and I(P) have the same man-optimal stable matching.
They also have the same woman-optimal stable matching. This is the case because we constructed
I(P) using ConstructInstance which lists every woman’s woman-optimal stable partner as the first
person in her preference list. This property holds in IL(P). Thus, when we run the woman-oriented
Gale-Shapley algorithm, the result will be the same for both instances.
For ease of discussion, let Sa and S
L
a denote the symmetric shortlists of agent a in I(P) and
IL(P) respectively. It is easy to verify that Sa is exactly the preference list of a in I(P). For a
woman w, her preference list in IL(P) consists of her preference list in I(P), which ends with her
man-optimal stable partner, followed by the missing men. Thus, SLw does not have the missing men.
On the other hand, every man’s preference list in IL(P) contains his preference list in I(P) as a
sublist. So if a man m is part of Sw, he will remain so in S
L
w. Thus, S
L
w = Sw.
16
Next, consider a man m. From our discussion above, we know that Sm is a sublist of S
L
m. If
the latter contains a woman w′ that is not in Sm, then SLw′ should have m. But we proved that
SLw′ = Sw′ so m is in Sw′ , which means w
′ is in Sm. A contradiction. Therefore Sm = SLm.
Constructing I(P) takes O(p + q) time. Creating LM1 and LM2 takes O(p + q) time. But
completing the women’s preference lists take O((p+q)2) time so constructing IL(P) takes O((p+q)2)
total time.
Let IL′(P) be the SM instance obtained from I(P) by assigning each woman in GW1 the list
LW1 and each woman in GW2 the list LW2. Then for each man, let his preference list be the one in
I(P) followed by an arbitrary ordering of the missing woman. We leave it up to the reader to verify
that IL′(P) and I(P) will have the same woman-optimal stable matching. Consequently, one can
show that IL′(P) is an SM with (∞, 2)-list preferences that realizes P. Like IL(P), it has O(p+ q)
agents and can be constructed in O((p+ q)2) time.
16Note that we don’t have to worry about SLw having more men than Sw because all the men between the
woman-optimal and man-optimal stable partners of w are part of Sw.
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6 From Path Decompositions to k-Range Preferences
Recall that an SM instance I is in Range(k, n) if there is an objective rank function f : M ∪W → [n]
such that for all m ∈M and w ∈W
f(w) ≤Pm(w) ≤ f(w) + k − 1, and
f(m) ≤Pw(m) ≤ f(m) + k − 1.
(7)
In this section, we describe an algorithm for constructing a k-range SM instance I realizing a given
poset P . Unlike the previous sections, the k-range construction is no longer just dependent only on P .
Rather, the k-range construction addtionally requires a path decomposition X = (X1, X2, . . . , X2p)
of H(P) as input, and the k for which I ∈ Range(k) depends on the width of X . Specifically, if
X has width k, then the instance I = IR(P) we construct will satisfy I ∈ Range(O(k)). The path
decomposition X determines the color set Cv for each vertex v, and its width affects the number of
agents created as well as the range of the agents’ rankings. Thus, the smaller k is, the more similar
are the preference lists.
We describe the construction in stages. We start by creating an SM instance I1(P) with
incomplete preferences that realizes P. We then extend the preference lists of the agents to create
another SM isntance I2(P) that still realizes P with longer—albeit still incomplete—preference lists.
Finally, we will complete the preference list of the agents to arrive at IR(P) ∈ Range(O(k)).
6.1 Creating I1(P) and I2(P)
Let [a, b] = {a, a + 1, . . . , b} and ` = b − a + 1. The bitonic sequence corresponding to [a, b] is a
permutation (s1, s2, . . . , s`) of its elements such that |si − si+1| ≤ 2 for i = 1, . . . , ` (and s`+1 = s1).
That is, any two consecutive numbers in the (circular) sequence differ by at most 2. For example,
(3, 5, 7, 6, 4) is a bitonic sequence for [3, 7]. In general, we can construct a bitonic sequence for [a, b]
by starting at a and incrementing each number by 2 until we reach b − 1 or b, then adding the
largest number that is not part of the sequence yet (b or b− 1), and decrementing each number by 2
until we reach a+ 1. Bitonic sequences will play a role in our implementation of ConstructInstance.
We will once again make use of ConstructInstance to create the SM instance with the following
specifications:
• For each edge (u, v), let φ((u, v)) = min {i |u, v ∈ Xi}. We know that φ((u, v)) is well-defined
because X is a path decomposition of H.
• For each v ∈ [p], let Cv = [av, bv + 1] where av = min {i | v ∈ Xi} and bv = max {i | v ∈ Xi}.
Since there is some Xi such that v ∈ Xi, notice that |Cv| ≥ 2 for every v ∈ [p]. Moreover,
every color assigned to some edge incident to v is in Cv. Thus, we are effectively skipping
Lines 2 to 9 of Algorithm 1. (Note that for this section, we shall also use i instead of c to
refer to the colors in Cv as the colors are indices in the path decomposition X .)
• For each v ∈ [p], let piv be a bitonic sequence of Cv.
Let us call the instance created by the above specification of ConstructInstance(H(P), φ) as I1(P).
Proposition 6.1. The SM instance I1(P) realizes P . It has O(kp) agents and it can be constructed
in O(kp+ q) time, where k is the width of X—the nice path decomposition of H(P)—and p and q
are the number of vertices and edges of H(P) respectively.
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Proof. Since I1(P) was constructed by ConstructInstance, the SM instance realizes P. Let us now
compute the instance’s number of agents. For each v ∈ [p] and each i ∈ [av, bv + 1], the algorithm
creates two agents mi,v and wi,v. By definition, av is the index when v is added to the path
decomposition X while bv + 1 is the index when v is removed from X . Now X is a nice path
decomposition so at most one vertex is removed at index i, i ∈ [2p]. It follows that, for a fixed i,
the number of women wi,v with v ∈ [p] is at most |Xi|+ 1 ≤ (k + 1) + 1 = k + 2 because X has
width k. The same bound holds for the number of men mi,v, v ∈ [p]. Thus, the total number of
agents is at most 2p× 2(k + 2) = O(kp).
Finally, let us consider the running time of the algorithm with the specifications. Creating
the agents and adding their man-optimal stable partners into their preference lists takes O(kp)
time. Adding their acceptable partners based on each edge of H(P) takes O(q) time. Finally,
for each v ∈ [p], creating ρv based on the bitonic sequence for [av, bv + 1] and adding the agents’
woman-optimal stable partners into their preference lists take O(|ρv|) time. But O(
∑
v |ρv|) = O(kp)
since each man and each woman is part of exactly one rotation. Thus, constructing I1(P) takes
O(kp+ q) time.
Proposition 6.2. In the SM instance I1(P) the following are true:
(i) For mi,v, i ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p], every woman wj,∗ that appears in his preference list has |j − i| ≤ 2.
(ii) For wi,v, i ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p], every man mj,∗ that appears in her preference list has |j − i| ≤ 2.
Proof. The preference list of mi,v starts with wi,v followed by women of the form wi,u such that
(u, v) ∈ E and φ((u, v)) = i and then ending with wi+,v. But |i+ − i| ≤ 2 because piv is a bitonic
sequence of [av, bv + 1].
For wi,v, her preference list starts with mi−,v, followed by men of the form mi,y such that
(v, y) ∈ E and φ((v, y)) = i and then ending with mi,v. Again, |i− − i| ≤ 2 because piv is a bitonic
sequence of [av, bv + 1].
For i ∈ [2p], let Mi = {mi,v | i ∈ Cv}. Similarly, let Wi = {wi,v | i ∈ Cv}. The above proposition
implies that for every man m ∈Mi, the women in his preference list is a subset of
Bi =
⋃
{Wj | j ∈ [2p], |j − i| ≤ 2} .
Similarly, for each woman m ∈Wi, the men in her preference list is a subset of
Di =
⋃
{Mj | j ∈ [2p], |j − i| ≤ 2} .
We create I2(P) from I1(P) by appending to each mi,v’s preference list in I1(P) the missing women
in Bi. Similarly, we append to each wi,v’s preference list in I1(P) the missing men in Di.
Proposition 6.3. In I2(P), for i ∈ Cv and v ∈ [p], mi,v’s preference list contains all women in Bi
while wi,v’s preference list contains all men in Di. Moreover, I2(P) realizes P.
Proof. The first part of the proposition is true by construction. Applying the same argument
we used to prove Corollary 2.14, I1(P) and I2(P) have identical shortlists. Thus, like I1(P), the
instance I2(P) also realizes P.
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1X = {1} , {1, 2} , {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3} , {2, 3, 4} , {3, 4} , {4} ,∅
C4 : { 5 6 7 8 }
C3 : { 3 4 5 6 7 }
C2 : { 2 3 4 5 6 }
C1 : { 1 2 3 4 }
pi4 = (5, 7, 8, 6)
pi3 = (3, 5, 7, 6, 4)
pi2 = (2, 4, 6, 5, 3)
pi1 = (1, 3, 4, 2)
1
Figure 6: Example of our k-range construction using the poset P as our running example. The top diagram
shows the Hasse diagram H(P). The top right gives a path decomposition of H(P) of width 2. Each edge
(u, v) in H(P) is labeled with the minimum index i such that u, v ∈ Xi. We also show the bitonic sequence
piv for each set Cv of indices. The bottom image shows the incomplete preferences computed by I1(P). As
before, men are depicted as blue nodes, while women are depicted as red. The men prefer blue to green to
red edges, while the women prefer the edges in the opposite order.
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6.2 Creating IR(P)
We now derive IR(P) from I2(P) as follows: for each mi,v, we create a preference list that has the
following structure:
mi,v : W1 W2 · · · Wi−3 mi,v’s preference list in I2(P) Wi+3 · · · W2p.
For each j ∈ [1, i − 3] ∪ [i + 3, 2p], the women in Wj are arranged so that their subscripts are
lexicographically increasing. Similarly, for each woman wi,v, her preference list has the following
structure:
wi,v : M1 M2 · · · Mi−3 wi,v’s preference list in I2(P) Mi+3 · · · M2p.
Again, the men inMj , j ∈ [1, i−3]∪[i+3, 2p] are arranged so that their subscripts are lexicographically
increasing. Hence, agents from each group will have similar, but nonetheless distinct complete
preference lists.
Lemma 6.4. IR(P) ∈ Range(9(k + 2)).
Proof. Fix wi,v ∈ Wi. Recall that Pm(wi,v) is the rank assigned by m to wi,v. In what follows,
we analyze minm∈M Pm(wi,v) and maxm∈M Pm(wi,v) as their difference will determine the range of
IR(P). By convention, the smaller the value of Pm(wi,v), the more desirable she is to m. Thus,
when Pm(wi,v) is small, we say that m ranked her high; conversely, when Pm(wi,v) is large, m ranked
her low.
The smallest index j so that wi,v ∈ Bj is i− 2. Thus, for all men in M1 ∪M2 ∪ . . . ,Mi−3, the
rank of wi,v in their preference lists is the same and is equal to |W1|+ |W2|+ . . .+ |Wi−1|+ |W ′i |+ 1
where W ′i contains the women in Wi with subscripts lexicographically less than wi,v.
However, a man in Mi−2 can rank wi,v as high as |W1| + |W2| + . . . + |Wi−5| + 1 because
wi,v ∈ Bi−2. It is easy to see that none of the men in Mi−1 ∪Mi ∪ . . . ∪M2p can provide a higher
rank for wi,v.
Using the same analysis, a man in Mi+2 can rank wi,v as low as |W1|+ |W2|+ . . .+ |Wi+4| and
no man can give her a worse ranking. Thus, in IR(P) the difference between the worst possible and
the best possible rank of wi,v is
|Wi−4|+ |Wi−3|+ . . .+ |Wi+4| − 1 ≤ 9(k + 2)
because, as we already noted in the proof of Proposition 6.1, each |Wi| ≤ k + 2. By setting f(wi,v)
to the best rank it received from a man, we have now shown that the range of the rankings of each
woman is at most 9(k + 2). A similar analysis holds for the range of the rankings of each men in
the women’s preference lists.
Lemma 6.5. The man-optimal stable matching of IR(P) is µ∗ = {(mi,v, wi,v), i ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]}. That
is, IR(P) and I1(P) have the same man-optimal stable matching.
Proof. We shall prove the above lemma like Lemma 5.4. Let S be the sequence of men whose
subscripts are lexicographically increasing. We then run the male-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm
on S. For our purposes, it is useful to think of S as consisting of men from M1, followed by men
from M2, etc. and ending with men from M2p. By doing induction on i ∈ [2p], we will prove that
each man mi,v ∈Mi has wi,v as his man-optimal stable partner.
Our basis step involves M1 ∪M2 ∪M3. Let mi,v be a man from one of the sets; i.e., i = 1, 2 or
3. Notice that his preference list in IR(P) begins with his preference list from I2(P) followed by
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women from Wi+3 ∪Wi+4 ∪ . . . ∪W2p. But his preference list from I2(P) begins with his preference
list from I1(P) followed by some arbitrary ordering of the missing women from Bi. Finally, I1(P)
was constructed by ConstructInstance so his preference list begins with wi,v. Thus, mi,v will propose
to wi,v first and she will accept because no one has proposed to her yet.
Assume that for `′ ≤ ` − 1 all men m`′,v ∈ M`′ is temporarily matched to w`′,v. Let us now
consider a man m`,v ∈M`. Recall that his preference list in IR(P) has the following structure:
m`,v : W1 · · · W`−3 m`,v’s list in I1(P) (missing women in B`) W`+3 · · · W2p.
When he proposes to some women wi,v ∈W1 ∪W2 ∪ . . . ,W`−3, she is already matched to mi,v
by assumption. But in wi,v’s preference list in IR(P), all the men in M` are ranked lower than mi,v,
which is the last man in her preference list in I1(P), so she will reject m`,v. If wi,v ∈ W`−3, for
example, her preference list looks like the one below:
wi,v : M1 · · · M`−6 wi,v’s list in I1(P) (missing men in D`−3) M` · · · M2p.
Thus, m`,v will propose to the first woman in his preference list in I1(P), which is w`,v. She is
currently free and will accept his proposal. So m`,v is temporarily matched to w`,v. We emphasize
that this is true for every man in M`.
By induction, we have shown that µ∗ = {(mi,v, wi,v), i ∈ Cv, v ∈ [p]} is the man-optimal stable
matching of IR(P).
Lemma 6.6. IR(P) and I1(P) have the same woman-optimal stable matching.
Proof. The women’s preference lists in IR(P) were constructed from I1(P) like the men’s preference
lists. In particular, every woman wi,v’s most preferred partner in I1(P) is her woman-optimal stable
partner mi−,v (just like mi,v’s most preferred partner in I1(P) is his man-optimal stable partner
wi,v.) Let S
′ be the sequence of women whose subscripts are lexicographically increasing. Applying
the same analysis as the proof of Lemma 6.5, we can show that running the the woman-oriented
Gale-Shapley algorithm on S′ will result in a stable matching that matches each woman wi,v to
mi−,v.
Theorem 6.7. Let H(P) be the Hasse diagram of a finite poset P with p vertices and q edges.
Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , X2p) be a nice path decomposition of H(P) whose width is k. Then there
exists an SM instance IR(P) ∈ Range(O(k)) that realizes P. IR(P) has O(kp) agents and can be
constructed in O(k2p2) time.
Proof. In Lemma 6.4, we established that IR(P) ∈ Range(9(k + 2)). According to Lemmas 6.5
and 6.6, the SM instances IR(P) and I1(P) have the same man-optimal and woman-optimal stable
matchings. By construction, every agent a has the same set of agents between their man-optimal
and woman-optimal stable partners in IR(P) and I1(P). It follows that the two instances have
identical symmetric shortlists. By Corollary 2.13, they also have identical rotation posets. From
Proposition 6.1, I1(P) realizes P and has O(kp) agents so IR(P) does too. Finally, constructing
I1(P) takes O(kp + q) time but assigning each agent a complete preference list in IR(P) takes
O((kp)2), which is the bottleneck. Thus, the running time of O(k2p2) follows.
Corollary 6.8. Let P be a finite poset on p elements with pathwidth pw. Then there is an SM
instance I with I ∈ Range(O(pw)) that realizes P . I can be constructed in time O(f(pw)p2 +pw2 p2)
for some function f depending only on the pathwidth of P.
Proof. By Corollary 2.22, a nice path decomposition X of H(P) can be computed in time O(f(pw)p2).
The desired result then follows from Theorem 6.7.
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7 From k-Range Preferences to Path Decompositions
In the previous section, we showed how starting with a finite poset P with pathwidth k, we can
construct an SM instance IR(P) ∈ Range(9k + 2). In this section, we show that the connection
between P’s pathwidth and the range of the SM instance created is not incidental: if I ∈ Range(k)
then R(I) has a path decomposition of width O(k2) that can be constructed efficiently.
Throughout the section, we assume the SM instances have complete preference lists. We begin
by noting that every SM instance belongs to Range(k, n) for some k ∈ [1, n − 1]. Let Range(I)
denote the smallest such k for which I ∈ Range(k). The parameter Range(I) can be thought of as
a similarity measure of the preference lists of the agents. The smaller Range(I) is, the more alike
the agents’ preferences lists are to each other. Computing Range(I) can be done easily.
Lemma 7.1. Given an SM instance I of size n, let k = Range(I). Computing k and an objective
rank function f that satisfies (7) can be done in O(n2) time.
Proof. For w ∈ W , let f(w) = minm∈M Pm(w) and Range(w) = maxm∈M {Pm(w)− f(w)}. Simi-
larly, for m ∈M , let f(m) = minw∈W Pw(m) and Range(m) = maxw∈W {Pw(m)− f(m)}. From (7),
I ∈ Range(k, n) if and only if k ≥ Range(w) for each w ∈ W and k ≥ Range(m) for each m ∈M .
Thus, we set k = maxa∈M∪W Range(a).
The objective rank function f and the range k can be obtained by going through the preference
lists of I which takes O(n2) time.
7.1 Bounding the Pathwidth of the Rotation Poset
Let I ∈ Range(k). Our goal in this subsection is to create a path decomposition for G(I), the
rotation digraph of I, whose width is O(k2). Since the Hasse diagram of R(I) is a subgraph of
G(I), it follows that the pathwidth of R(I) is also O(k2). Towards bounding the pathwidth, we will
assign each rotation ρ ∈ R(I) an interval that is based on the objective ranks of the agents in the
rotation and then show that the maximum number of intervals that contain a particular i ∈ [1, n],
where n is the size of I, is O(k2). We now present a series of structural results.
Proposition 7.2. Let I ∈ Range(k, n) with objective rank function f . Then for all i ∈ [n]
i ≤ |{w ∈W | f(w) ≤ i}| ≤ i+ k − 1, and
i ≤ |{m ∈M | f(m) ≤ i}| ≤ i+ k − 1. (8)
Proof. We will show that the bounds for |{w ∈W | f(w) ≤ i}| are correct. The second set of
inequalities follow by interchanging the roles of the men and women.
Recall that every man m’s ranking function Pm : W → [n] is a bijection. Now, consider a woman
w with f(w) ≤ i. According to (7), Pm(w) ≤ i+ k − 1. If |{w ∈W | f(w) ≤ i}| > i+ k − 1, Pm will
have to assign at least two women with f(w) ≤ i the same rank, contradicting the fact that Pm is a
bijection.
On the other hand, suppose |{w ∈W | f(w) ≤ i}| < i so that |{w ∈W | f(w) > i}| ≥ n− i+ 1.
Every woman w with f(w) > i will have Pm(w) > i according to (7). Thus, Pm will have to assign at
least n− i+ 1 women the ranks i+ 1, . . . , n, which again contradicts the fact that Pm is a bijection.
It follows that the bounds for |{w ∈W | f(w) ≤ i}| hold.
Lemma 7.3. Let I ∈ Range(k, n) with objective rank function f . Then for any stable pair (m,w)
of I,
|f(m)− f(w)| ≤ 2k − 2. (9)
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Proof. We will show that
f(w) ≤ f(m) + 2k − 2. (10)
The proof of the other inequality is identical, interchanging the roles of m and w.
Let µ be a stable matching of I such that (m,w) ∈ µ. To prove (10), we shall bound Pm(w)
below using f(w) and above using f(m). The former is straightforward—by (7), f(w) ≤ Pm(w).
For the latter, we consider the number of women w′ that m prefers to w, which we know is
Pm(w)− 1. Each such woman w′ must be matched to a man m′ that she prefers to m. Now, by (7),
Pw′(m) ≤ f(m) + k − 1 so f(m′) ≤ Pw′(m′) < f(m) + k − 1. The number of men that will satisfy
this property is bounded by∣∣{m′ ∣∣ f(m′) ≤ f(m) + k − 2}∣∣ ≤ f(m) + 2k − 3. (11)
It follows that that m prefers at most f(m) + 2k − 3 women to w so
f(w) ≤ Pm(w) ≤ f(m) + 2k − 2,
whence (10) follows.
Proposition 7.2 and Lemma 7.3 have the following consequences, which will be useful in our
description of rotation posets arising from SM instances with k-range preferences.
Corollary 7.4. Let I ∈ Range(k, n) with objective rank function f . Suppose
ρ = (m0, w0), (m1, w1), . . . , (m`−1, w`−1)
is a rotation of I. Then for all i = 0, 1, . . . , `− 1, we have
|f(mi)− f(mi+1)| ≤ 4k − 4, and
|f(wi)− f(wi+1)| ≤ 4k − 4.
(12)
Proof. Let ρ be exposed in the stable matching µ of I. Then (mi+1, wi+1) ∈ µ while (mi, wi+1) ∈ µ\ρ.
Applying Lemma 7.3 twice (along with the triangle inequality) gives
|f(mi)− f(mi+1)| = |f(mi)− f(wi+1) + f(wi+1)− f(mi+1)|
≤ |f(mi)− f(wi+1)|+ |f(wi+1)− f(mi+1)|
≤ 2(2k − 2),
as desired.
Corollary 7.5. Let I ∈ Range(k, n). Then each agent in I has at most 5k − 4 stable partners. In
particular, each agent can appear in at most 5k − 5 rotations.
Proof. Assume the objective rank function of I is f . Let us prove the result for a man m. Let Wm
denote his stable partners in I. By Lemma 7.3, all women w ∈Wm satisfy
f(m)− 2k + 2 ≤ f(w) ≤ f(m) + 2k − 2. (13)
By Proposition 7.2, we have
|{w ∈W | f(w) ≤ f(m) + 2k − 2}| ≤ f(m) + 3k − 3.
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Similarly, Proposition 7.2 implies that
f(m)− 2k + 1 ≤ |{w ∈W | f(w) < f(m)− 2k + 2}| .
Combining the previous two expressions, the number of women w satisfying (13) is at most
(f(m) + 3k − 3)− (f(m)− 2k + 1) = 5k − 4.
Except for his partner in the women-optimal stable matching, m appears with each of its stable
partners in a rotation. Thus, m can be part of at most 5k − 5 rotations.
We now define the interval that will be assigned to each rotation of I.
Definition 7.6. Let ρ = (m0, w0), (m1, w1), . . . , (m`−1, w`−1) be a rotation of I ∈ Range(k, n) with
objective rank function f . Define the extent of ρ, denoted ext(ρ), as the interval
[fmin(ρ)− 2k + 1, fmax(ρ) + 2k − 1]
where
fmin(ρ) = min
0≤i≤`−1
{f(mi), f(wi)} and fmax(ρ) = max
0≤i≤`−1
{f(mi), f(wi)} .
Lemma 7.7. Let I ∈ Range(k, n) and G(I) be the rotation digraph of I. Suppose (ρ, σ) is a
directed edge in G(I). Then there exists i ∈ [n] such that i ∈ ext(ρ) ∩ ext(σ).
Proof. Let f be the objective rank function. The DAG G(I) contains an edge (ρ, σ) only when
Rule 1 or 2 of Remark 2.8 is satisfied. We consider the cases corresponding to these rules below.
Case 1. If Rule 1 applies, then there exists m ∈ M and w,w′ ∈ W such that (m,w) ∈ ρ and
(m,w′) ∈ σ. Since m appears in both ρ and σ, we have f(m) ∈ ext(ρ) ∩ ext(σ), as desired.
Case 2. Suppose Rule 2 applies. Then there exists m and w such that w is part of the rotation ρ
while m = mi is in the rotation σ = (m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (m`, w`) and
Pm(wi) < Pm(w) < Pm(wi+1). (14)
We know that f(wi) ≤ Pm(wi). Since wi is a stable partner of m, by Lemma 7.3
f(m)− 2k + 2 ≤ Pm(wi). (15)
On the other hand, wi+1 is also a stable partner of m. From the proof of Lemma 7.3 we also
know that
Pm(wi+1) ≤ f(m) + 2k − 2. (16)
Combining (14), (15) and (16) gives
|Pm(w)− f(m)| ≤ 2k − 2. (17)
Finally, applying the triangle inequality and the definition of k-range preferences, we obtain
|f(w)− f(m)| ≤ |f(w)− Pm(w)|+ |Pm(w)− f(m)|
≤ (k − 1) + (2k − 2)
= 3k − 3.
Since [f(w)− 2k + 1, f(w) + 2k − 1] ⊆ ext(ρ) while [f(m)− 2k + 1, f(m) + 2k − 1] ⊆ ext(σ),
|f(w)− f(m)| ≤ 3k − 3 implies that ext(ρ) ∩ ext(σ) 6= ∅.
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Thus, for all edges (ρ, σ) in G, we have ext(ρ) ∩ ext(σ) 6= ∅, as desired. Now we note that the
non-empty intersection can happen in three ways:
• [fmin(ρ), fmax(ρ)] ∩ [fmin(σ), fmax(σ)] 6= ∅
• [fmax(ρ), fmax(ρ) + 2k − 1] ∩ [fmin(σ)− 2k + 1, fmin(σ)] 6= ∅ or
• [fmax(σ), fmax(σ) + 2k − 1] ∩ [fmin(ρ)− 2k + 1, fmin(ρ)] 6= ∅.
In each case, some i ∈ [n] has to be part of this intersection since the objective ranks of all agents
are in [n].
Lemma 7.8. Let I ∈ Range(k, n) and integer i ∈ [n]. Then there are at most 50k2 rotations ρ
such that i ∈ ext ρ.
Proof. Let f be the objective rank function. Consider the set {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρ`} of rotations whose
extents contain i. That is, for all j we have i ∈ ext ρj . By the definition of ext, for each ρj , there
exists an agent aj in ρj such that
|f(aj)− i| ≤ 2k − 1 (18)
Following the proof of Corollary 7.5, the number of women that satisfy (18) is at most 5k − 2.
Similarly, the number of men that satisfies the same inequality is at most 5k − 2. Thus, at most
10k − 4 agents satisfy the inequality. But each such agent can be part of at most 5k − 5 rotations.
Therefore, ` ≤ (10k − 4)(5k − 5) = 50k2 − 70k + 20 ≤ 50k2 when k ≥ 1.
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 7.9. Suppose I ∈ Range(k, n) and R = R(I) is its rotation poset. Then pw(R) ≤ 50k2.
Proof. Let I ∈ Range(k) have objective rank function f . Let G = G(I). Consider the sequence
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) defined by
Xi = {ρ ∈ V | i ∈ ext(ρ)} .
We claim that X is a path decomposition of G. We argue that each of the three conditions in
Definition 2.16 are satisfied:
1.
⋃n
i=1Xi = V holds because each rotation ρ ∈ V has a non-empty extent, and intersects the
interval {1, . . . , n}.
2. For each edge {ρ, σ} ∈ E, there exists i ∈ [n] such that ρ, σ ∈ Xi. This holds by Lemma 7.7.
3. For all i, j, k ∈ [n] with i ≤ j ≤ k, we have Xi ∩Xk ⊆ Xj . To see this, suppose ρ ∈ Xi ∩Xk.
Then i, k ∈ ext(ρ) by the definitions of Xi and Xk. Therefore, ρ ∈ Xj , because ext(ρ) is an
interval, as desired.
By Lemma 7.8, X has width at most 50k2. Thus, G has pathwidth at most 50k2. And since the
Hasse diagram of R, H(R), is a subgraph of G, it follows that H(R) has a path decomposition
whose width is at most 50k2. Thus, R also has pathwidth at most 50k2, the desired bound.
Corollary 7.10. There is no constant c such that every poset can be realized by an instance in
Range(c).
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Proof. For any positive integer n, there is a tree Tn whose pathwidth is at least n [43]. Take any
vertex z of Tn and orient all edges away from z and call the new directed acyclic graph ~Tn. Notice
that the transitive reduction of ~Tn is itself since Tn contains no cycles. Let Pn be poset whose Hasse
diagram is ~Tn. By definition, the pathwidth of Pn is equal to the pathwidth of ~Tn, which is at least
n. Let c be a fixed constant. By Theorem 7.9, every SM instance I in Range(c) has a rotation poset
whose pathwidth is at most 50c2. Thus, if n > 50c2, no instance in Range(c) can realize Pn.
Given an SM instance I, Algorithm ConstructPathDecomposition incorporates the steps from
the discussion above to create a nice path decomposition for G(I), the rotation digraph of I, whose
width is O(k2) where k = Range(I).
Algorithm 2 ConstructPathDecomposition(I = (M,W,P )). Construct rotation digraph G(I) and
nice path decomposition X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) of width O(k) where k = Range(I).
1: Compute G(I) using Gusfield’s algorithm (Theorem 2.5).
2: Compute k = Range(I) and the objective rank function f (Lemma 7.1).
3: for all rotations ρ ∈ G(I) do
4: fmin(ρ)← min {f(a) | a ∈ ρ}
5: fmax(ρ)← max {f(a) | a ∈ ρ}
6: ext(ρ)← [fmin(ρ)− 2k + 1, fmax(ρ) + 2k − 1]
7: end for
8: Initialize all the sets in (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) to empty sets.
9: for all rotations ρ ∈ G(I) do
10: for all i ∈ ext(ρ) ∩ [1, n] do
11: Add ρ to Xi
12: end for
13: end for
14: Convert (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) into a nice path decomposition (Lemma 2.20).
Corollary 7.11. Given an SM instance I of size n, there exists an O(k2n + n2)-time algorithm
that computes the rotation digraph G(I) and a nice path decomposition X of G(I) with width at
most 50k2, where k = Range(I).
Proof. Gusfield’s algorithm takes O(n2) time to compute G(I) (Theorem 2.5). Computing k and
objective function f also takes O(n2) time (Lemma 7.1). Determining ext(ρ) takes O(|ρ|) time so
doing this for all rotations takes O(
∑
ρ |ρ|) = O(n2) because each man-woman pair can be in at most
one rotation. Computing the path decomposition (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) takes O(k
2n) since each |Xi| ≤
50k2 according to Theorem 7.9. Finally converting (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) to a nice path decomposition
takes O(k2n) time (Lemma 2.20). Thus, the total running time of ConstructPathDecomposition is
O(k2n+ n2).
8 Algorithmic Implications
We now describe FPT algorithms for several computationally hard stable matching problems
parameterized by Range(I). The results rely on Theorem 7.9 and Corollary 7.11, as well as FPT
algorithms in [8, 19].
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8.1 Counting and Sampling Stable Matchings
In a companion paper [8], we prove the following results:
Theorem 8.1 ([8]). Let G be a directed acyclic graph with n vertices. Given G and a simple path
decomposition X of G of width r, there is an algorithm that computes the number of closed subsets
of G in O(2rrn) time.
Theorem 8.2 ([8]). Let G be a directed acyclic graph with n vertices. Given G and a simple
path decomposition X of G of width r, there is an algorithm that returns a downset of G sampled
uniformly at random in time 2O(r)nO(1).
Corollary 8.3. Let I be an SM instance of size n and k = Range(I). The number of stable
matchings of I can be computed in O(250k
2
k2n+ n2) time.
Proof. By Corollary 7.11, we can compute the rotation digraph G(I) and a simple path decomposition
of G(I) of width at most 50k2 in O(k2n+n2) time. By Theorem 2.5, the number of stable matchings
for I is down(G(I)), which we can compute in time O(250k
2
k2n) by Theorem 8.1. Thus, computing
the number of stable matchings of I can be done in O(250k
2
k2n+ n2) time.
Corollary 8.4. Let I be an SM instance of size n and k = Range(I). There is an algorithm that
samples the stable matchings of I uniformly at random in 2O(k
2)nO(1) time.
Proof. Again, we compute G(I) and a simple path decomposition of G(I) of width at most 50k2 in
O(k2n+ n2) time. By Theorem 8.2, we can sample a downset Z of G(I) uniformly at random in
time 2O(k
2)nO(1). Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the downsets of G(I) and the
stable matchings of I, it follows that the stable matching µ formed by eliminating all the rotations in
Z from the man-optimal stable matching µM is a stable matching of I chosen uniformly at random.
Computing µ from µM and Z takes O(n
2) time.
8.1.1 Finding Median Stable Matchings
For SM instance I, let M(I) contain all the stable matchings of I and N = |M(I)|. For each stable
matching µ ∈ M(I) and for each agent a, let µ(a) denote a’s partner in µ. Sort the multiset of
agents {µ(a), µ ∈M(I)} from a’s most preferred partner to a’s least preferred partner. The agent(s)
in the middle of this sorted list is referred to as the (lower or upper) median stable partner
of a. A median stable matching is a stable matching where every agent is paired with a median
stable partner.
Teo and Sethuraman [44] were the first to recognize that every SM instance I has a median
stable matching. Cheng [6, 7] showed that median stable matchings of I are also remarkable in that
they are exactly the median elements in the lattice of stable matchings of I. That is, their average
distance to all the stable matchings of I is the least. Thus, median stable matchings are fair in a
very strong sense. She also characterized these stable matchings in terms of the rotations of I and
used it to show that computing a median stable matching is #P-hard.
Theorem 8.5 (Cheng [6, 7]). Suppose an SM instance I has N stable matchings. For each rotation
ρ of I, let nρ denote the number of downsets of G(I) that contain ρ. When N is odd, I has only
one median stable matching and it corresponds to the downset
{ρ |nρ ≥ (N + 1)/2} .
On the other hand, when N is even, every median stable matching of I corresponds to the downset
of the form
{ρ |nρ ≥ (N/2) + 1} ∪ S where S ⊆ {ρ |nρ = N/2} .
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Corollary 8.6. Given SM instance I of size n, a median stable matching of I can be computed in
2O(k
2)nO(1), where k = Range(I).
Proof. Our starting point is once again the rotation digraph G(I) and a nice path decomposition X
of G(I) whose width is O(k2). These structures can be constructed in O(k2n+ n2) time. We can
then compute N , the number of stable matchings of I in 2O(k
2)nO(1) time.
Next, for each rotation ρ, let Anc(ρ) consist of ρ and its ancestors in G(I). Notice that every
downset of G(I) that contains ρ is of the form Anc(ρ) ∪ T where T is a downset of G(I) \Anc(ρ).
Thus, nρ = down(Gρ), where Gρ = G(I) \Anc(ρ). To compute nρ, we first construct Gρ and a nice
path decomposition Xρ for Gρ from G(I) and X . This will take O(n2 + kn) time. Then we use
them to compute down(Gρ) in 2
O(k2)nO(1). So the total time for computing nρ is 2
O(k2)nO(1).
We now have the ingredients for computing a median stable matching of I. We start by finding
µM , the man optimal stable matching. Then we determine the set Z = {ρ |nρ ≥ (N + 1)/2}. By
Theorem 8.5, the stable matching obtained by eliminating Z from µM is a median stable matching.
These steps take O(n2) time.
The bottleneck for our procedure is the computation of N and nρ, ρ ∈ G(I). It follows that the
running time is 2O(k
2)nO(1).
8.1.2 Finding Sex-Equal and Balanced Stable Matchings
Given a stable matching µ of I, the satisfaction of an agent a with µ can be represented by Pa(µ(a)),
the rank of a’s partner in µ. The total satisfaction of the men and women with µ then are
SM (µ) =
∑
m∈M Pm(µ(m)) and SW (µ) =
∑
w∈W Pw(µ(w)) respectively. A natural strategy for
computing a fair stable matching of I is to create a measure for µ that captures how fair µ is to the
agents of I.
In the sex-equal stable marriage problem (SESM), the fairness measure of µ is
δ(µ) = |SM (µ)− SW (µ)|
and the goal is to find a stable matching of I whose SESM fairness measure is as small as possible.
Kato [26] showed that SESM is NP-hard.
In the balanced stable marriage problem (BSM), the fairness measure of µ is
β(µ) = max {SM (µ), SW (µ)} .
The goal this time is to find a stable matching of I whose BSM fairness measure is as large as
possible. Feder [13] showed that BSM is NP-hard.
Gupta et al. [19] recently considered the parametrized complexity of several hard variants of the
SMP parametrized by the treewidth of the rotation poset. Specifically, they proved the following
result.
Theorem 8.7 (Gupta et al. [19, Theorem 3]). The sex equal and balanced stable matching problems
are both solvable in time O(2twn6) where tw is the treewidth of the rotation poset of the SM instance
of size n.
Since the pathwidth of a graph is an upper bound to its treewidth, Theorem 8.7 together with
Theorem 7.9 immediately gives the following corollary.
Corollary 8.8. Let I be an SM instance of size n and k = Range(I). Then computing a sex-equal
and balanced stable matching for I can be done in time 2O(k
2)n6.
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9 Discussion and Questions
Counting stable matchings in graphs Our k-bounded model is equivalent to SM instances
defined on (bipartite) graphs with maximum degree at most k. Thus Theorem 4.2 implies that
#SM remains #BIS-complete even when restricted to graphs with maximum degree 3. Since graphs
with maximum degree 2 (i.e., 2-bounded instances) are disjoint unions of paths and cycles, #SM
can be solved on 2-bounded instances in polynomial time. (Paths have unique stable matchings, and
each cycle can support 1 or 2 stable matchings.) Thus #SM has a sharp hardness threshold in the
k-bounded model at k = 3. Interestingly, #BIS shows a similar threshold around k = 6: counting
independent sets in bipartite graphs of maximum degree k ≥ 6 is #BIS-complete [4], while instances
of maximum degree k ≤ 5 admit an FPRAS, even if vertices on only one side of the bipartition obey
the degree bound [32]. Recently, Curticapean et al. [10] considered other parameterized variants of
#BIS, and showed that the variants admit efficient fixed-parameter algorithms in bounded-degree
graphs.
It would be interesting to see if #SM becomes easy in any “natural” restricted graph class.
Question 1. For what families of (bipartite) graphs can #SM be computed or approximated
efficiently? Can #SM be efficiently computed in planar graphs? Graphs of bounded genus? What
rotation posets can be realized by these restricted instances?
It seems likely that planar SM instances (i.e., instances where the graph G of acceptable partners
is planar) realize a restricted family of rotation posets. To see why, note that every rotation
corresponds to a cycle in G, and a rotation ρ can be immediate predecessor of ρ′ only if either the
corresponding cycles intersect, or there is an edge connecting a node in one cycle to a node in another.
This restriction seems to limit what rotation posets are realizable by planar instances. For example,
we believe that a poset P whose Hasse diagram is a sufficiently large complete bipartite graph minus
a perfect matching cannot be realized by any planar instance. Does the family of rotation posets
realized by planar SM instances admit a clean description? Can such a characterization be used to
solve structural SM problems more efficiently than the general case?
Incomplete preferences and ties The k-attribute, (k1, k2)-list, and k-range preference models
can also be used to describe SMI instances—that is, SM instances with incomplete preferences.
Specifically, an SMI instance arising from one of these models is an instance for which every
preference list is a sub-list of an instance in the model with complete preferences. Our construction
for the (k1, k2)-list model in Section 5 has the property that there are two master preferences for
each gender such that all (incomplete) preference lists are sub-lists of one of the two master lists.
Thus, every finite poset is realizable ing the SMI variant of the (2, 2)-list model. Since complete
preferences are a special case of SMI instances, our k-attribute construction also implies that SMI
k-attribute preferences realize all finite posets.
Question 2. What rotation posets can be realized in the SMI variant of the k-range model?
These restricted preference models can also be generalized to allow for preferences with ties:
that is, an agent may be indifferent to a choice of several partners. It is well-known that many
stable marriage problems become intractible in instances with both incomplete preferences and ties
(see, e.g., [34]).
Question 3. Consider SM instances with ties and incomplete preferences. What stable matching
problems remain NP-hard when restricted to instances arising from the k-attribute, (k1, k2)-list, or
k-range models?
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k-attribute and Euclidean Preferences Theorem 4.7 characterizes the rotation posets realized
in the k-attribute model for k ≥ 6, but does not say anything about Attr(k) for k ≤ 5.
Question 4. What rotation posets are realized by Attr(k) for k = 2, 3, . . . , 5?
We conjecture that Attr(k) realizes arbitrary rotation posets for any k ≥ 3. This conjecture
is consistent with the results of Chebolu et al. [5], who show that #SM is #BIS-complete in the
k-attributed model for any k ≥ 3. Our use of cyclic polytopes in Section 4.2 to establish Theorem 4.7
is wasteful in the sense that cyclic polytopes give much stronger guarantees than our result actually
requires. Indeed, the construction allows us to embed any 2-dimensional simplicial complex into
R6 in convex position. However, our argument only requires that the 2-dimensional faces of the
complexes corresponding to preference lists output by ConstructInstance be embedded in convex
position. Thus it seems that a more careful analysis of the output of ConstructInstance could
establish Theorem 4.7 for smaller values of k.
Chebolu et al. [5] and Ku¨nnemann et al. [31] also consider the k-Euclidean preference model
defined by Bogomolnaia and Laslier [3]. In this model, each agent is also associated with a point in
Rk. Preferences are determined by the Euclidean distance between the points: a prefers agents in
order b1, b2, . . . , bn where b1 is a’s nearest agent, b2 the second nearest, and so on. Chebolu et al. [5]
showed that #SM is #BIS complete in the k-Euclidean model for k ≥ 2.
Question 5. What rotation posets are realized in the k-Euclidean model?
We suspect that k-Euclidean preferences realize arbitrary posets for a relatively small fixed
constant k.
Ku¨nnemann et al. [31] also consider an asymmetric version of the k-Euclidean model in which
each agent a has two associated points in Rk: a position ~xa and an opinion ~ya. The agent a ranks
agents in order of their position’s distance to a’s opinion. That is a ranks b1 with ~yb1 closest to ~xa
first, and so on.
Our 6-attribute construction can be modified to realize arbitrary rotation posets in the asymmetric
6-Euclidean model. In the modified construction, the positions of each m ∈ M and w ∈ W are
the same as the embedding in Section 4.2 (i.e., each agent corresponds to a vertex of a cyclic
polytope). If m1,m2,m3 appear on w’s preference list in the 3-bounded instance constructed by
ConstructInstance, then she can choose her opinion ~xw so that (the positions of) ~xm1 , ~xm2 , and ~xm3
are the three closest positions to ~xw as follows. Let ~cw denote the circumcenter of the triangle in
the plane determined by ~xm1 , ~xm2 , and ~xm3 , and let
~βw ∈ R6 be the vector defined immediately
after (1), so that −~βw is an outward facing normal vector for the plane containing ~xm1 ,m2, and m3.
Thus, for any point p ∈ R6 of the form ~y = ~cw − t~βw with t ∈ R, the points m1,m2 and m3 are all
equidistant from ~y. By choosing t sufficiently large, we can ensure that, in fact, ~xm1 , ~xm2 and ~xm3
are the three closest points in M to ~y. By taking ~yw to be a slight perturbation of such a ~y, we can
ensure that for all m 6= m1,m2,m3, we have
|~xm1 − ~yw| < |~xm2 − ~yw| < |~xm3 − ~yw| < |~xm − ~yw| .
That is, w ranks m1, m2, and m3 (in that order) ahead of all other men. As with the 6-attribute
case, repeating the procedure for all men and women is sufficient to prove that the corresponding
asymmetric 6-Euclidean instance realizes the same rotation poset as the underlying 3-bounded
instance.
k-list Preferences While Theorem 5.3 characterizes the rotation posets realizable by (k1,∞)-list
SM instances, it does say anything about (k1, k2)-list preferences for constant k2, nor the original
k-list preference structure of Bhatnagar et al. [1].
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Question 6. What rotation posets can be realized in the (k1, k2)-list model for k1, k2 < n?
We suspect that for k1 = k2 = 2, the rotation poset is restricted, but we are unsure of how to
prove even this seemingly simple fact. We note that Ku¨nnemann et al. [31] had similar difficulty
with the k-range model, and posed as an open question whether or not 2-list preferences admit an
o(n2)-time algorithm for finding a stable matching.
k-range Preferences Our construction in the proof of Theorem 7.9 shows that every k-range
instance has a rotation poset whose pathwidth is at most 50k2. Can this bound be improved?
Question 7. What is the maximum pathwidth of R(I) for I ∈ Range(k)? Is it Ω(k2)? Or can our
O(k2) upper bound be imporved to, say, O(k)?
Distributed Stable Matchings The stable marriage problem has a natural interpretation as a
distributed problem, where each agent is represented by a processor and agents communicate via
point-to-point communication. In fact, the Gale-Shapley algorithm [15] has a natural interpretation
in such a computational model. It is straightforward to show that finding a stable matching requires
a number of rounds proportional to the network diameter, even when there are no constraints on
local computation and communication (i.e., in the LOCAL model described in [40]). If bathdwidth
is restricted to O(log n) bits per edge per communication round (i.e., the CONGEST model [40]),
finding a stable matching still requires Ω(
√
n) rounds, even in networks of diameter O(log n) [28].
Can stable matchings be found faster in distributed models of computation if the preferences are
restricted?
Question 8. Consider the distributed stable marriage problem in which each agent is represented
by a processor. How many communication rounds are needed to find a stable matching if the
preferences are assigned according to the k-attribute, (k1, k2)-list, or k-range models?
We note that “almost stable” matchings can be computed in O(1) rounds in bounded-degree
networks [14] and logO(1)(n) rounds in general networks [39]. The work of Khanchandani and
Wattenhofer [27] shows that stable matchings in the k-range model can be computed with less total
communication than the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
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